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I. INTRODUCTION 
If the 1990s can reasonably be referred to as the “registration 
decade” with regard to sex-offender statutes,
1
 then the first decade of 
the twenty-first century could accurately be considered the “tracking 
decade.”  Since 2005, an increasing number of states have expanded 
their registration programs to allow for various degrees of electronic 
monitoring of sex offenders to deal with the dangers that post-
incarceration sex offenders pose to their communities.
2
  As the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly stated, “Sex offenders are a serious 
threat in this Nation.”
3
  At least as far as the Court is concerned, there 
is no doubt that sex offenders, once released back into our communi-
ties, pose a significant danger of recommitting the crimes that led to 
their incarceration in the first place.
4
  Especially when dealing with 
sexual predators who target children, the public seems to want noth-
ing more than to “lock ‘em up and throw away the key.”
5
 
The trend in the law has been to place sex offenders into a form 
of “internal exile” upon release from prison, restricting their rights in 
 
 * J.D., 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Kean University.  I 
would like to thank Professor Alice Ristroph and Daniel McGrady for their guidance 
throughout the writing process.  I would also like to thank my wife, my family, and 
my friends for their unwavering support. 
 1 See 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006) (requiring all states to establish a program to reg-
ister and track sex offenders). 
 2 Ian Friedman et al., Sexual Offenders: How to Create a More Deliberative Sentencing 
Process, CHAMPION, Dec. 2009, at 12, 17, available at 
http://www.iannfriedman.com/?/ianf/articles_detail/creating_a_more_deliberative
_sentencing_process_for_sex_offenders/. 
 3 Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) (quoting McKune v. 
Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32 (2002) (plurality opinion)). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Friedman et al., supra note 2, at 12. 
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various ways “that exclude them from major aspects of society.”
6
  The 
use of global positioning system (GPS) tracking on post-incarceration 
sex offenders is the latest manifestation of this internal exile, allowing 
the government to know where an offender is at all times.  Yet, there 
are privacy issues and other limitations inherent in the use of GPS 
tracking of sex offenders that undoubtedly lead to an invasion of 
their individual rights and are much more intrusive than registration 
alone.
7
  Unlike registration requirements, which render a sex offend-
er’s status openly available only to those people searching for it, an 
external GPS device on an offender’s ankle or belt can reveal this in-
formation to the public wherever the offender goes.
8
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has already affirmed the constitutional-
ity of registration requirements,
9
 but the constitutionality of this new 
plethora of sex-offender tracking statutes has yet to be tested.  The 
Court upheld registration requirements as a “civil regulatory scheme” 
to notify the public about the threat of sex-offender recidivism and 
not as a punitive measure,
10
 but GPS tracking is much more restric-
tive.  This Comment seeks to restore the balance between the rights 
of the individual sex offender and the security interest of society by 
examining the arguments on both sides of the issue and ultimately 
proposing a model statute that would survive constitutional review. 
The proliferation of GPS-tracking statutes started out the same 
way as most sex-offender legislation:
11
 a horrible crime was committed 
 
 6 Nora v. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral 
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 153 (1999). 
 7 See Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 196–97 (Mass. 2009) (explaining 
that a lifetime GPS-tracking requirement is “dramatically more intrusive and burden-
some” than registration only). 
 8 See Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1011–12 (6th Cir. 2007) (Keith, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that wearing a “relatively large satel-
lite monitoring device[]” is similar to having a police escort following the offender 
wherever he goes and acts as “a modern day scarlet letter” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 9 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003) (holding that Alaska’s sex offend-
er registration law is non-punitive and does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause of the 
U.S. Constitution); Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2003) (hold-
ing that Connecticut’s sex offender law does not violate the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment even if registration does cause injury to reputation). 
 10 Smith, 538 U.S. at 105–06. 
 11 See Whitman Latest to Urge Laws on Notices of Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 
1994, at 24 (describing the push for Megan’s Law after the rape and murder of sev-
en-year-old Megan Kanka by a convicted sex offender); Editorial, Keeping Track of 
Child Molesters, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 6, 1994, at A10 (describing the push for the 
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children Registration Act (Jacob Wetterling Act) 
after the kidnapping of 11-year-old Jacob Wetterling). 
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against a child and prompted legislators to take action.
12
 Jessica Luns-
ford, a name that is associated with many of these statutes, was a nine-
year-old girl in Homosassa, Florida, who was kidnapped, raped, and 
murdered by a registered sex offender in 2005.
13
  Even though her 
murderer was a registered sex offender who had been jailed previous-
ly for four years for exhibiting indecent behavior in front of a kinder-
gartener, he was still able to get a job working at Jessica’s school on a 
construction project.
14
  His criminal record was never checked, and 
that gave him the opportunity to victimize Jessica, ultimately burying 
her under his motor home only 150 yards away from Jessica’s parents’ 
home.
15
 
The Jessica Lunsford case created a public outcry that registra-
tion for post-incarceration sex offenders was not enough; in response, 
Florida State Representative Charles Dean drafted the original “Jessi-
ca Lunsford Act” to allow real-time tracking by GPS of violent sex of-
fenders.
16
  A few different variations of this initial statute have been 
written, and this Comment will not be limited to the original statute; 
rather it will focus on the developing body of law across the nation as 
a whole.
17
  These new statutes are merely part of the increasingly 
harsh treatment that sex offenders face when they finish their prison 
sentences,
18
 and one question that has yet to be asked is whether forc-
ing a sex offender to wear a tracking device for decades, or even for 
the rest of his
19
 life, goes too far. 
This Comment will examine the broad array of sex-offender 
tracking statutes and the question of whether such laws would survive 
 
 12 See Mark Memmott, Girl’s Death Raises Questions About Tracking of Sex Offenders, 
USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 2005, at 4A. 
 13 Mark Memmott, Girl’s Death Raises Questions About Tracking of Sex Offenders, USA 
TODAY, Mar. 25, 2005, at 4A. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Please note that this Comment will focus on the effect that such statutes have 
on post-incarceration sex offenders who have already served their time in prison and 
have been forced to wear a GPS tracking device after their release back into society.  
There are additional situations, such as house arrest prior to trial as a condition of 
bail, that may also lead to the utilization of GPS-tracking or similar technologies, but 
such situations are outside of the scope of this Comment. 
 18 See Isaac B. Rosenberg, Involuntary Endogenous RFID Compliance Monitoring as a 
Condition of Federal Supervised Release—Chips Ahoy?, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 331, 334 
(2008) (“Sex offenders are the foremost targets of our nation’s punitive zeal.” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). 
 19 Please note that this Comment will use male pronouns, but this in no way indi-
cates that all sex offenders are male or that the GPS-tracking statutes could not 
equally apply to female offenders. 
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Supreme Court scrutiny if their constitutionality is challenged.  Part 
II will review the various statutory models, providing a general survey 
of which states have such electronic-monitoring capability and how 
slight differences in statutory wording or construction can have a 
large constitutional impact.  Part III will provide an overview of the 
various arguments against the constitutionality of GPS-tracking stat-
utes and the numerous ways in which these statutes restrict sex of-
fenders’ rights.  Part IV will examine the constitutional arguments of 
the opposing side, which tends to view such restrictions as reasonable 
limitations on the rights of sexual predators.  Part V will deliver this 
Comment’s findings and propose several ways in which the various 
states can amend their current statutes in order for these statutes to 
survive constitutional challenges.  For example, such statutes should 
(1) be based on an individualized risk assessment, (2) should not be 
applied retroactively, and (3) should not provide usable evidence 
when an offender is within a protected area.  Lastly, Part VI will pro-
pose a model statute that would be likely pass constitutional review. 
II.  STATUTORY MODELS 
Forty-one states and the District of Columbia allow some form of 
electronic monitoring of sex offenders, but the laws vary greatly as to 
how they are written and applied.
20
  Even though there are a few dis-
tinct models that can be used to group together similar states, there 
are also states that have gone in different directions from the Florida 
Model, the California Model, or the Massachusetts Model.  Florida,
21
 
California,
22
 and Massachusetts
23
 are considered the main statutory 
models for this Comment because they were the first three states to 
enact a detailed statutory scheme for sex-offender GPS tracking and 
because many states follow these models.  A few states, however, have 
departed from these three main approaches.
24
  In addition, there has 
been some federal action in this area of law,
25
 and there are still nine 
states where sex offenders are tracked solely through the registration 
laws in force.
26
  Part II is a survey of the laws’ similarities, differences, 
and approaches to various problems that post-incarceration sex of-
fenders pose. 
 
 20 See discussion infra Parts II.A–D. 
 21 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 22 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 23 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 24 See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 25 See discussion infra Part II.E. 
 26 See discussion infra Part II.D.2. 
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A.  The Florida Model 
On May 2, 2005, the Florida governor approved the original 
statute drafted by Representative Dean, dubbed the “Jessica Lunsford 
Act,” less than three months after Jessica originally went missing.
27
  In 
response to the public perception that registration alone was not 
enough to prevent sexual predators from committing heinous crimes, 
the new statute required heightened “community control” supervi-
sion for those sex offenders who were deemed a threat.
28
  The Act re-
quired the Department of Corrections to develop a “graduated risk 
assessment” to identify those sex offenders who pose a heightened 
risk of recidivism by December 1, 2005.
29
 
The law imposed different treatment for violent sex offenders 
depending on the date that the crime was committed.
30
  If the of-
fender committed any one of specific crimes
31
 on or after October 1, 
1997, but prior to September 1, 2005, it was within the court’s discre-
tion whether to submit him to electronic monitoring.
32
  For any of-
fender who committed those same crimes on or after September 1, 
2005, however, the court was required to order “mandatory electronic 
monitoring as a condition of the probation or community-control su-
pervision.”
33
  For certain sex offenders who preyed on children, the 
court was no longer allowed to impose leniency because the state was 
now required to know where they were at any moment while under 
community supervision.
34
 
Although the Florida statute was very clear that mandatory track-
ing was required only for offenses committed after the statute’s effec-
tive date, the legislature enacted another statute at the same time to 
bring a significant number of sex offenders whose crimes were com-
mitted prior to September 1, 2005, within the electronic-monitoring 
 
 27 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.30 (LexisNexis 2010) (effective Sept. 1, 2005). 
 28 Id. § 948.061. 
 29 Id. § 948.061(1). 
 30 Id. § 948.30(2). 
 31 Id. §§ 800.04, 827.071, 847.0135(5), 847.0145 (allowing the use of post-
incarceration GPS tracking for the following offenses: “Lewd or lascivious offenses 
committed upon or in the presence of persons less than 16 years of age,” “sexual per-
formance by a child,” prohibited “computer transmissions” with a child, and the 
“selling or buying of minors”).  In comparison with other states like California, see 
discussion infra Part II.B, the Florida law limits GPS tracking to very few crimes focus-
ing exclusively on the abuse or exploitation of minors. 
 32 Id. § 948.30(2) (emphasis added). 
 33 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.30(3) (LexisNexis 2010) (emphasis added). 
 34 See id. § 948.11(6) (requiring “a system that actively monitors and identifies the 
offender’s location”). 
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mandate if they committed any violation of their probation or pa-
role.
35
  In State v. Petrae, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District 
found that the trial court was required to order electronic monitor-
ing of an offender who committed “lewd or lascivious battery” by hav-
ing sex with a thirteen-year-old girl in November 2003 and then vio-
lated his probation in 2006.
36
  The court pointed out the irony in the 
fact that it would be within the trial court’s authority to end the pro-
bation altogether, but while the probation was in effect, the court had 
no discretion to modify the electronic-monitoring mandate for pro-
bation violators.
37
 
This wide net for probation violations does not need to be trig-
gered by a new sex offense.  A court may impose mandatory electron-
ic monitoring even if a person previously designated as a “sexual 
predator” commits a probation violation that has nothing to do with 
the aforementioned sexual offenses.
38
  In State v. Lacayo, the offender 
was designated a sexual predator in 1999
39
 but violated probation by 
fleeing a police officer in 2005, a violation that the trial court did not 
believe could trigger electronic monitoring.
40
  The appeals court re-
versed, holding that any probation violation for a person previously 
designated to be a sexual predator, whether the probation violation 
was sexual or not, was enough to trigger mandatory electronic moni-
toring.
41
 
Fields v. State yielded a similar result in a situation where the of-
fender had committed her crime in 1999 and then violated her sub-
sequent probation by driving habitually with a suspended license in 
2006.
42
  Even though the probation violation had nothing to do with 
her original offense and was not even remotely sexual in nature, the 
courts were required to grant the motion for electronic monitoring.
43
  
There is no room for judicial discretion once a sex offender who has 
committed in the past one of the enumerated crimes violates proba-
tion in any way, and this wide net is being used to justify the GPS 
tracking of many sex offenders regardless of how long ago they com-
 
 35 Id. § 948.063. 
 36 35 So. 3d 1012, 1013–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 37 Id. at 1014 n.2. 
 38 8 So. 3d 385, 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 39 Id. at 386 (receiving this designation—“following his convictions for lewd and 
lascivious assault on a child and for sexual battery on a helpless victim”). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 387. 
 42 968 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).   
 43 Id. at 1033–34.   
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mitted their crime.  This retroactivity was built into the Florida Mod-
el, and the state is very quick to use it at the earliest opportunity.
44
 
In other cases, the courts have not yielded to the state’s rush to 
sweep prior offenders into the mandatory electronic monitoring pro-
gram under the probation-violation exception.  In Bell v. State, an of-
fender was accused of violating a condition that the probation officer 
had added after the original court-ordered probation was set up, im-
mediately pushing the state to file a request for mandatory electronic 
monitoring.
45
  The court held that the officer was not allowed to im-
pose additional conditions and then attempt to move for electronic 
monitoring when the offender had not violated any of the court’s 
conditions for probation.
46
  Bell is a good example of the state’s read-
iness to pursue electronic monitoring for sex offenders who trip up 
on their probation without any judicial discretion to protect the of-
fender’s interests. 
Courts have shown ample confusion in the application of the 
Florida sex-offender-tracking statutes, and this confusion does not al-
ways stem from a court trying to use discretion where mandatory elec-
tronic monitoring is required.  On a number of occasions, trial courts 
have been under the impression that electronic monitoring was 
mandatory in cases in which it was actually discretionary.
47
 This has 
led appeals courts to repeatedly insist on an individual assessment of 
an offender’s risk to the community if his crime was committed be-
fore September 1, 2005.
48
  In Burrell v. State, for example, the offender 
committed lewd battery on a child in 2002, prior to the effective date 
of the Jessica Lunsford Act.
49
  Even though the Department of Cor-
rections and the courts had discretion to decide whether Burrell re-
quired electronic monitoring, the trial court imposed monitoring 
without any risk assessment, mistakenly assuming that it was manda-
tory under Florida Criminal Code section 984.30.
50
  The appeals court 
reversed and remanded, holding that where the statute gives the 
courts discretion, the offender deserves an individual assessment of 
 
 44 See, e.g., Lacayo, 8 So. 3d at 387; Fields, 968 So. 2d at 1033. 
 45 24 So. 3d 712, 713–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).   
 46 Id. at 714. 
 47 See, e.g., Burrell v. State, 993 So. 2d 998, 999 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“How-
ever, in this case, the trial court was under the mistaken impression that it was re-
quired to impose the electronic monitoring under the Act.  The court stated at the 
hearing that the proposed reinstatement of probation ‘is a GPS mandatory.’”). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id.   
 50 Id. 
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whether electronic monitoring is required.
51
  For anyone who com-
mitted the applicable crime on or after September 1, 2005, however, 
no individualized review is required; the court must impose electron-
ic monitoring for the term of the offender’s probation.
52
 
Fourteen states have adopted the Florida Model, requiring elec-
tronic monitoring when an offender who committed an enumerated 
crime is on probation after incarceration.
53
  Each of these states en-
acted some form of mandatory electronic monitoring for sex offend-
ers on probation, but there are subtle differences.  For example, Ala-
bama’s statute is very close to the Florida statute, requiring anyone 
adjudicated to be a “sexually violent predator” to be subject to elec-
tronic monitoring.
54
  Alabama actually goes one step further than 
Florida, though, not only requiring anyone who commits certain 
crimes to automatically be electronically monitored upon release 
from incarceration but also mandating that such electronic monitor-
ing be in effect for a minimum of ten years, a specification that Flori-
da did not enact.
55
  Although differences exist, the statutes of these 
fourteen states are similar enough to the original Jessica’s Law to fall 
under the larger categorization of the Florida Model. 
The Florida Model, which requires electronic monitoring during 
the probation period based not upon the individual’s threat of 
reoffending but on the crime committed, is the most prevalent form 
of sex-offender electronic-monitoring statutory model. This is likely 
due to the fact that the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act 
of 2006,
56
 a federal law providing state grants for sex-offender elec-
 
 51 Id. at 1000. 
 52 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.30(3) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 53 ALA. CODE § 15-20-26.1 (LexisNexis 2010) (effective Sept. 1, 2006); ALASKA 
STAT. § 12.55.100 (f) (2010) (effective Sept. 23, 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-902(G) 
(LexisNexis 2010) (effective June 21, 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4121(u) (2010) 
(effective May 17, 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-8308(3), 20-219(2) (2010) (effective 
July 1, 2009); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8A-6 (LexisNexis 2010) (effective July 1, 
2007); IOWA CODE § 692A.124(1) (2010) (effective May 21, 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 15:560.4(A) (2010) (effective Aug. 15, 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-206 (2010) 
(effective July 1, 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-10.1(E) (LexisNexis 2010) (effective 
July 1, 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-540 (2010) (effective July 1, 2006); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 23A-27-12.1, 24-15A-24 (2010) (effective Mar. 7, 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
303 (2010) (effective July 1, 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-11D-3(a) (LexisNexis 
2006) (effective Oct. 1, 2006). 
 54 ALA. CODE § 15-20-26.1 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 55 Id. § 15-20-26.1(c). 
 56 42 U.S.C. § 16981 (2006) (effective Oct. 1, 2006). 
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tronic-monitoring programs that meet minimum requirements, was 
modeled after the Florida statute.
57
 
B.  The California Model 
One of the harshest statutory models enacted thus far is the Cali-
fornia sex offender tracking statute.  Known as the Sexual Predator 
Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law (SPPCA), the statute was 
approved by California voters as Proposition 83 in 2006.
58
  Governor 
Schwarzenegger then approved the SPPCA on September 20, 2006, 
and the sections which were deemed to be “urgent” went into effect 
immediately while the “[n]on-urgen[t]” provisions went into effect 
on January 1, 2007.
59
  A clear illustration of the punitive effect that 
the SPPCA was meant to have on sex offenders is evident from the 
bill’s name on the ballot initiative: Sex Offenders. Sexually Violent 
Predators. Punishment, Residence Restrictions and Monitoring.  Initia-
tive Statute.
60
   
The bill required the Department of Corrections and Rehabilita-
tion to assess “every eligible person who is incarcerated or on parole 
for the risk of reoffending” by using the State-Authorized Risk As-
sessment Tool for Sex Offenders (SARATSO).”
61
  The enacted statute 
mandated lifetime electronic monitoring by GPS for any offender 
who committed certain offenses, without any reference to the date 
that the offense was actually committed.
62
  Unlike the Florida Model, 
which is very specific as to the date ranges within which discretionary 
and mandatory electronic monitoring is triggered,
63
 the California 
Model makes no mention of any retroactive application, and leaves it 
to the courts to decipher legislative intent. 
The mandatory lifetime GPS monitoring applies to anyone con-
victed in any jurisdiction of a much broader list of offenses as soon as 
he is released on parole.
64
  Needless to say, the California Model is 
 
 57 See discussion infra Part II.E.2. 
 58 People v. Milligan, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550, 554 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).   
 59 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv.  Ch. 336 (West). 
 60 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 83 (West)(emphasis added).  
 61 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv.  Ch. 336 (West). 
 62 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004 (Deering 2010) (effective Nov. 8, 2006).   
 63 See supra notes 30, 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 64 The commission of the following offenses requires post-incarceration GPS-
tracking: murder “committed in the perpetration, or an attempt to perpetrate, rape,” 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(c) (Deering 2010), sodomy, Id. § 286,  lewd or lascivious acts, 
Id. § 288, oral copulation involving children, Id. § 288(a), penetration by a foreign 
object involving children, Id. § 289, kidnapping, Id. § 207, “kidnapping for gain or to 
commit robbery or rape,” Id. § 209, if the intent was to violate any of the previously 
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much broader than the Florida Model,
65
 encompassing many more 
criminal acts.  While the Florida Model allows court discretion for 
acts committed prior to September 1, 2005,
66
 the California Model 
removes all judicial discretion from the equation, mandating GPS 
monitoring for life for a much broader list of offenses.
67
  In essence, 
since section 290(c) of the California Penal Code applies to any con-
victions since July 1, 1944, courts could have interpreted section 
3004(b), as written, to require lifetime GPS tracking of someone who 
was incarcerated for making a lewd telephone call to a minor in 
1944.
68
  In addition, the offender being tracked is required to pay for 
any costs associated with his monitoring by the Department of Cor-
rections and Rehabilitation.
69
  This is the broadest and harshest of the 
sex-offender statutory models. 
The California legislators initially left open the possibility of the 
GPS-tracking requirement applying to crimes committed at the end 
of World War II, but the California courts have since closed off any 
possibility of retroactive application.
70
  In People v. Milligan, an of-
fender was originally required to register in 1987 and challenged ad-
ditional conditions placed on him retroactively as violating the ex 
post facto provisions in the United States and the California Constitu-
tions.
71
  The court made a clear distinction between statutory provi-
sions that were punitive in nature and those that were “a regulatory 
scheme that is civil and nonpunitive.”
72
  Although the court found 
that DNA sampling and registration requirements were not punitive 
 
listed sections plus “[r]ape, duress, or menace,” Id. § 261, voluntarily aiding or abet-
ting a person in committing these acts, Id. § 264.1, “[a]ssault with intent to commit 
mayhem or specified sex offenses, Id. § 220, [a]ssault of a person under 18 years of 
age with intent to commit specified sex offenses,” Id., excluding “assault to commit 
mayhem,” Id. § 243.3, various aforementioned offenses involving the use of force or 
violence, Id. § 290(c), “any offense involving lewd or lascivious conduct,” Id., while 
“contributing to delinquency of [a] minor,” or “[l]uring [a] minor under 14 away 
from home,” Id. § 272, or any felony violation involving the sending of “harmful mat-
ter to [a] minor by telephone messages, electronic mail, Internet, or commercial 
online service,” Id. § 288.2.  In addition, the statute covers “any statutory predecessor 
that includes all elements” of any of the enumerated penal code sections, or conspir-
acy to commit any of the listed offenses.  Id. § 290(c).  
 65 See supra notes 30, 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 66 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 67 Id. § 3004(c). 
 68 See supra note 64. 
 69 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004 (c) (Deering 2010). 
 70 Doe v. Schwarzenegger, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181–82 (E.D. Cal. 2007); Peo-
ple v. Milligan, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 71 Milligan, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 553–54.   
 72 Id. at 555 (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)).   
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in nature, the court did not address the issue whether the GPS-
tracking requirement was punitive because the Attorney General 
conceded that the law only operated prospectively and not retroac-
tively, which made the point moot.
73
 
A similar case attacking the statute’s retroactive application, Doe 
v. Schwarzenegger was a multiple-plaintiff case in which various sex of-
fenders challenged the constitutionality of the state’s attempt to ap-
ply the SPPCA retroactively on the same grounds as in Milligan.
74
  
One plaintiff, referred to as “John Doe I,” had originally committed a 
crime requiring registration twenty years earlier and was later jailed 
and paroled for not following the registration requirements.
75
  After 
his release, he obtained approval from the Department of Correc-
tions and Rehabilitation to live at a location that was within 2,000 feet 
of several neighborhood parks, which was not a crime until the 
SPPCA imposed harsh residency requirements along with the GPS-
tracking requirement.
76
  In October 2006, when Proposition 83 
seemed likely to pass, he received a letter mandating that he move 
away from the parks to comply with the new statute.
77
  The other two 
“John Does” were in similar circumstances, which required them to 
leave their homes because of the state’s attempt to apply the SPPCA 
retroactively.
78
  The district court found that the SPPCA could not 
apply retroactively because the statute did not expressly state the leg-
islature’s intent that it be applied not solely prospectively, and there-
fore, the plaintiffs were not required to move in order to comply with 
the new law.
79
  Even though the courts have definitively held that the 
California statute only applies prospectively, it is still the strictest of 
the sex-offender tracking-statute models passed in the last decade. 
Seven states have endorsed the California Model and mandate 
lifetime electronic monitoring for various classes of sex offenders.
80
  
 
 73 Id. at 554.  
 74 Doe, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1178.  
 75 Id. at 1179.   
 76 Id. at 1179–80.  
 77 Id. at 1180.  
 78 Id.  
 79 Id. at 1181–82.   
 80 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-14(e) (2011) (effective July 1, 2006); MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. PROC. § 11-723(c)(1)(i), (d)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2011) (effective Apr. 13, 2010); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520n(1) (LexisNexis 2011) (effective May 30, 2006); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 217.735 (2011) (effective June 5, 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.40, 
208.40A(c) (2011) (effective Dec. 1, 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-8.2.1 (2009) (effec-
tive June 28, 2006); WIS. STAT. § 301.48 (2011) (effective July 1, 2007). 
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As with the Florida Model,
81
 while this category does encompass those 
states that require mandatory lifetime monitoring of certain sex of-
fenders, there are differences beyond this core similarity.  For exam-
ple, in Georgia there is a slight difference with the California Model 
in that there is an individual assessment for how likely it is that the of-
fender will strike another child, but once a person is deemed a “sex-
ually dangerous predator,” he is required to wear a GPS tracking de-
vice for the rest of his natural life.
82
 
In Maryland, a sex-offender-tracking statute similar to the Cali-
fornia Model applies to various crimes committed on or after Octo-
ber 1, 2010.
83
  Even though there is no specific date of applicability in 
the California Model, the Maryland statute can accurately be includ-
ed under the California Model category because it requires lifetime 
GPS monitoring based on the crime committed, not the specific indi-
vidualized threat of recidivism.
84
  Michigan adopted the California 
Model but focused on the age of the offender and the victim, trigger-
ing lifetime electronic monitoring if certain crimes are committed 
when the offender is at least seventeen and the victim is less than thir-
teen.
85
  Missouri requires lifetime monitoring for offenders who have 
committed certain crimes
86
 but adds a unique provision that allows a 
court to terminate lifetime electronic monitoring when the offender 
has reached the age of sixty-five.
87
  Even with these differences, the 
California Model is the second most prevalent statutory scheme, like-
ly because the harsher requirements are more popular with a public 
who, as stated before, wants to “lock [sex offenders] up and throw 
away the key.”
88
 
C. The Massachusetts Model 
A third main model of sex-offender-tracking statutes is the Mas-
sachusetts Model, which allows judicial discretion when determining 
an individual’s length of probation, but then requires GPS tracking 
for the entire probationary period for certain sexual crimes.
89
  The 
original bill made sweeping changes to Massachusetts’s laws regard-
 
 81 See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 82 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-14(e) (2011).   
 83 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-723(c)(1)(i), (d)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 84 Id. § 11-723(a).  
 85 MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520n(1) (LexisNexis 2011).   
 86 MO. REV. STAT. § 217.735 (2011). 
 87 Id. § 559.106(4).   
 88 Friedman, supra note 2, at 12. 
 89 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 47 (2011) (effective Dec. 20, 2006). 
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ing sex-offender monitoring and punishments and was approved on 
September 21, 2006, the day after the California statute was signed 
into law.
90
  Under Massachusetts law, a sex-offender registry board was 
created to keep track of any sex-offender registry information,
91
 main-
tain compliance with the requirements of the Jacob Wetterling Act,
92
 
and classify the public threat that each sex offender poses to the 
community.
93
  The board is required to classify each sex offender on a 
scale ranging from level one offenders (“risk of reoffense is low”)
94
 up 
to level three offenders (“risk of reoffense is high”).
95
 The board then 
works with the sentencing court to determine the appropriate proba-
tionary period for the individual offender,
96
 an element of judicial 
discretion that is lacking in the California Model.
97
 
The sex-offender tracking statute then applies as a mandatory 
condition of probation to offenders who committed an enumerated 
crime.
98
  Similarly to the scope of the California Model,
99
 this is a 
 
 90 2006 Mass. Legis. Serv. 303 (West). 
 91 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178D (2011). 
 92 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006). 
 93 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178L (2011). 
 94 Id. § 178K(2)(a). 
 95 Id. § 178K(2)(c).   
 96 Id. § 178K(1).   
 97 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 98 The commission of the following offenses required GPS-tracking during the 
probationary period, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178C (2011): “indecent assault and 
battery on a child under 14,” MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13B (2011); “indecent as-
sault and battery on a mentally retarded person,” Id. § 13F, “indecent assault and bat-
tery on a person age 14 or over,” Id. § 13H, rape, Id. § 22, “rape of a child under 16 
with force,” Id. § 22A, “rape and abuse of a child,” Id. § 23, “assault with intent to 
commit rape,” MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 24 (2011), “assault of a child with intent to 
commit rape,” Id. § 24B, “kidnapping of a child,” Id. § 26, “enticing a child under the 
age of 16 for the purposes of committing a crime,” Id. § 26C, “enticing away a person 
for prostitution or sexual intercourse,” MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 2 (2011), “drug-
ging persons for sexual intercourse,” Id. § 3, “inducing a minor into prostitution,” Id. 
§ 4A; “living off or sharing earnings of a minor prostitute,” Id. § 4B, “second and sub-
sequent adjudication or conviction for open and gross lewdness and lascivious behav-
ior,” Id. § 16, “incestuous marriage or intercourse,” Id. § 17, “disseminating to a mi-
nor matter harmful to a minor,” Id. § 28, “posing or exhibiting a child in a state of 
nudity,” Id. § 29A, “dissemination of visual material of a child in a state of nudity or 
sexual conduct,” Id. § 29B, “possession of child pornography,” Id. § 29C, “unnatural 
or lascivious acts with a child under 16,” Id. § 35A, “aggravated rape,” MASS. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 277, § 39 (2011), any of the aforementioned offenses involving a child, 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178C (2011), any of the aforementioned offenses that is 
categorized as a “sexually violent offense” under Massachusetts law, Id., and any at-
tempt to commit any of the enumerated sex offenses or a “like violation” under an-
other jurisdiction’s laws, Id.  
 99 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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broad category of crimes, some of which do not involve any physical 
contact with a child, but any of the offenses that require a period of 
probation or community supervision as decided by the sentencing 
board also mandate a GPS tracker for the probationary period.
100
  In 
addition, the probationer must pay “[t]he fees incurred by installing, 
maintaining and operating the global positioning system device, or 
comparable device.”
101
 
Aside from helping to determine the necessary period of proba-
tion, the sex-offender registry board must also determine the “de-
fined geographic exclusion zones including, but not limited to, the 
areas in and around the victim’s residence, place of employment and 
school and other areas defined to minimize the probationer’s contact 
with children, if applicable.”
102
  If the tracked offender enters any of 
the excluded zones, the police is notified and the offender is arrest-
ed.
103
  This is a unique specification in the Massachusetts statute be-
cause the Florida and the California Models do not specify how the 
transmitted tracking data will be used. 
Unlike the California Model which mandates lifetime tracking 
based on the crime committed, under the Massachusetts Model, the 
judiciary has discretion regarding the length of the probationary pe-
riod, which is determined on an individualized basis.
104
  But, such dis-
cretion evaporates if the offender fails to comply with his sex-offender 
registration requirements.
105
  Similar to Florida’s probation-violation 
provision,
106
 the Massachusetts registration-violation provision man-
dates “community parole supervision” for life, depending on the of-
fense originally committed and the number of times the offender has 
violated his registration requirements.
107
  Anyone placed on lifetime 
parole must also wear a GPS device “for the length of his parole,” 
which has the same effect as mandating lifetime GPS tracking for an 
offender who violates his registration requirements, even though it is 
split into two different statutes.
108
  The judicial discretion to control 
the period of probation is thus nullified if the sex offender does not 
 
 100 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 47 (2011).  
 101 Id. 
 102 Id.  
 103 Id. 
 104 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 105 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178H (2011).   
 106 See supra notes 35–46 and accompanying text. 
 107 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178H (2011). 
 108 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 127, § 133D1/2 (2011).   
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comply with his registration requirements under the Massachusetts 
Model. 
Unlike the Florida and the California Models, which base their 
application on the date on which the crime was committed,
109
 the 
courts have interpreted the Massachusetts statute to focus on the date 
on which the probation was sentenced, which makes the actual date 
of the crime irrelevant.
110
  In Commonwealth v. Cory, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts read the phrase “is placed on proba-
tion”
111
 strictly and held that, even if the crime was committed prior to 
the effective date of the statute, it was the date on which the offender 
was placed on probation that was important.
112
  This interpretation 
brings more sex offenders within the ambit of the statute because 
sometimes there can be a long period of time between the actual 
commission of a crime and the imposition of probation or parole as a 
result of that crime.  For example, even if an applicable crime was 
committed in 1990, if probation was not imposed until December 21, 
2006, the day after the tracking statute went into effect, the offender 
would be required to wear the GPS tracker for at least the probation-
ary period, but possibly for the rest of his life. 
The Massachusetts courts have also been much more ready to 
accept the true punitive nature of GPS sex-offender tracking than 
other courts.
113
  In the court’s opinion, the physically attachment of a 
GPS device to a person’s body’ was a “serious, affirmative restraint” 
on the wearer especially because it has to remain attached for years 
and may not be tampered with.
114
  In addition, the court found that 
the continuous tracking data that the GPS device releases is “an af-
firmative burden on liberty.”
115
  Although the issue in Cory was wheth-
er or not the probationary GPS-tracking requirement could be ap-
 
 109 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.30(2) (LexisNexis 2011); see People v. Milligan, 83 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 550, 561 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that in California the court’s in-
terpretation focuses on whether the crime was permitted before the effective date 
when any indication of retroactive application is not present in the statute). 
 110 See Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 191 (Mass. 2009).   
 111 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 47 (2010). 
 112 Cory, 911 N.E.2d at 191 n.6. 
 113 Compare id. at 196–97 (stating that a lifetime GPS-tracking requirement is 
“dramatically more intrusive and burdensome” when compared to registration only), 
with State v. Bowditch, No. 448PA09, 2010 N.C. LEXIS 741, at *30–31 (N.C. May 10, 
2010) (finding that a GPS-tracking requirement, while having an impact on the of-
fender, is not a criminal punishment when compared to disbarment or post-
incarceration involuntary confinement because offenders are still allowed “to choose 
where they work and what type of occupation they pursue”).   
 114 Cory, 911 N.E.2d at 196–97.  
 115 Id. 
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plied retroactively, the case is instructive because the court held that 
the forced wearing of a GPS tracking device on its own was restrictive 
on the offender’s liberty when the Massachusetts tracking laws can 
require GPS tracking for the rest of an offender’s natural life under 
certain circumstances.
116
 
Commonwealth v. Thissell is a good example of the various inci-
dental ways that GPS tracking devices reduce the wearer’s rights.
117
  In 
Thissell, the offender was placed on probation in 2004 for various as-
saults on his wife.
118
  He violated his probation by contacting his wife 
while he was in prison in 2005, which resulted in an additional proba-
tionary condition of GPS monitoring.
119
  In 2007, a bench warrant was 
issued for the offender because he went to the beach and submerged 
the GPS device when swimming in the ocean.
120
  The electronic moni-
toring system used in Massachusetts “consists of two pieces of elec-
tronic equipment: an ankle bracelet, which is permanently attached 
to the probationer, and a GPS-enabled cellular telephone, which 
communicates with the ankle bracelet and transmits the probation-
er’s current location to the probation department.”
121
  A monitoring 
agent called the tracking cell phone to inform Thissell that he should 
not enter the water because it would damage the device that was 
permanently attached to his ankle.
122
  Even though the inability to 
swim in the ocean might not seem to be a significant limitation on 
the wearer’s rights, such limitations could also translate into a gov-
ernment order that the person shall not swim in the ocean or a pool 
or shall not submerge his ankle during a bath for the remainder of 
his life. 
Out of the three main models, the Massachusetts Model gives 
the most judicial discretion because the judiciary is allowed to deter-
mine the requisite probationary period based on an individual as-
sessment of the risk that a person poses to society.  The individualized 
assessment is important because it allows tailoring of a probation pe-
riod based on the actual risk that the offender poses to society, as op-
 
 116 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178H (2011) (mandating lifetime community pa-
role supervision for certain sex offenders who violate their registration require-
ments); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 127, § 133D1/2 (2010) (mandating GPS tracking for 
the length of the community parole supervision). 
 117 928 N.E.2d 932 (Mass. 2010). 
 118 Id. at 933. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 934–35.  
 121 Id. at 933 n.1 (quoting Commonwealth v. Raposo, 905 N.E.2d 545, 546 (Mass. 
2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 122 Thissell, 928 N.E.2d at 934.   
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posed to determining the probation period based on the overall 
threat that people who commit a specific crime generally pose to so-
ciety as a whole.  It is still a very strict statute, however.  Given the 
wide range of offenses covered under the Massachusetts statute and 
the imposition of mandatory electronic monitoring of whatever pro-
bationary period the court deems just and proper, there are still a 
great number of people who will be tracked under this statute for the 
foreseeable future.  The Massachusetts Model does represent a 
unique statutory model but it has not, to date, been enacted in any 
other jurisdiction. 
D. The Hybrid Models 
Florida, California, and Massachusetts were the first three states 
to enact detailed statutes for the GPS tracking of sex offenders,
123
 but 
not all states have followed their lead.  Some have followed the feder-
ally mandated registration requirements only;
124
 others have adopted 
their own statutory solutions for the electronic monitoring of sex of-
fenders.
125
 
1. States Without a Sex-Offender-Tracking Statute 
Only nine U.S. jurisdictions have failed to implement some form 
of electronic monitoring since 2005.
126
  These nine states have con-
tinued to rely solely on registration laws to protect society from the 
danger of sex-offender recidivism.
127
  Even some of these jurisdictions, 
however, have expressed interest in the possibility of sex-offender 
GPS-tracking legislation.  For example, two of these states, Indiana 
and Kansas, have undertaken feasibility studies to explore the possi-
 
 123 See discussion supra Part II.A–C. 
 124 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 11-8-8-7 (LexisNexis 2011) (effective Mar. 24, 2006); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4904 (2011) (effective Apr. 22, 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
17.510 (LexisNexis 2011) (effective Mar. 27, 2009); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 34-A, § 11202 
(2011) (effective June 23, 2005); MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2009) (effective Aug. 1, 
1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-B:2 (2011) (effective Aug. 9, 1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
57, § 583 (2010) (effective Mar. 15, 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.595 (2011) (effective 
July 14, 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5402 (2011) (effective Sept. 1, 1996). 
 125 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-923 (2011) (effective Apr. 7, 2006); NEV. REV. 
STAT.  § 176A.410(1), (2)(b)–(c) (2011) (effective Oct. 1, 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2C:43-6.4(a) (West 2011) (effective Jan. 14, 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.91(c) 
(West 2011) (effective Aug. 6, 2007); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 837-r(1), (2)(d) (Consol. 
2011) (effective Apr. 13, 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4) (Consol. 2011) (effective 
June 22, 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-302(b) (2011) (effective July 1, 2004); 
WASH. REV. CODE . § 9.94A.704(5) (2011) (effective Aug. 1, 2009). 
 126 See statutes cited supra, note 124.   
 127 See statutes cited supra, note 125.   
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bility of implementing an electronic-monitoring sex-offender stat-
ute.
128
 
Indiana, while currently without an electronic monitoring stat-
ute, did implement a pilot program to assess the costs of tracking vio-
lent sex offenders by GPS.
129
  The Indiana Department of Correction 
(IDOC) explored the costs of active GPS tracking of violent sex of-
fenders, and the report submitted to the legislative council discusses 
the positive and the negative findings from the pilot program.
130
  The 
IDOC found that the GPS technology was an asset for parole agents 
in keeping track of the parolees whom they were required to monitor 
and that the ability of agents to utilize the technology from laptops 
with wireless accessibility improved the agents’ mobility.
131
 
The IDOC report also found the following negative points with 
the technology: 1) poor utilization of police resources due to false 
alarms, 2) high costs of $15–$22 per offender, per day, 3) ankle 
bracelets are not actually permanent because they can be removed, 
4) the GPS technology does not prevent crimes from occurring, 5) 
comparable results between GPS technology and traditional electron-
ic monitoring technology, 6) logistical problems with monitoring 
homeless offenders, and 7) signal-reception issues with the technolo-
gy.
132
  Since the report was issued, a GPS-tracking statute has not been 
enacted and there are no bills in the state legislature to implement 
such a system. 
Kansas, likewise, created a Sex Offender Policy Board (SOPB)
133
 
that explored the utilization of sex offender electronic monitoring 
and issued a report to the Kansas Criminal Justice Coordinating 
Council.
134
  The SOPB found that GPS-tracking technology should be 
utilized only selectively, for the worst offenders, by assessing the risk 
for each individual to determine who are the offenders who “pose the 
greatest risk to the community.”
135
  The board found that the tech-
nology, by itself, “will not change behavior and is not enough to pro-
 
 128 See IND. DEP’T OF CORR., 2007 RESEARCHED COST OF GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS 
(2007), available at 
http://www.in.gov/legislative/igareports/agency/reports/CORR05.pdf; KAN. SEX 
OFFENDER POLICY BD., REPORT (2007), available at http://www.calcasa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2007/11/sopbreport.pdf. 
 129 See IND. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 128. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9501(8)(F)(i) (2011). 
 134 KAN. SEX OFFENDER POLICY BD., supra note 128. 
 135 Id. at 2. 
DANTE_ FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  10:51 AM 
2012] COMMENT 1187 
vide security for the community.”
136
  It also found most of the negative 
consequences of the GPS-tracking technology that the Indiana report 
noted.
137
  Like Indiana, Kansas has not implemented a GPS-tracking 
sex-offender statute; civil commitment is still the preferred method of 
dealing with dangerous sex offenders in Kansas.
138
  Such interest in 
the concept, however, shows that the remaining nine states without 
GPS-tracking of sex offenders may utilize some form of the technolo-
gy as costs decrease and the devices become more reliable. 
2.  States with Discretionary Electronic Monitoring 
Some states have enacted statutes that are entirely discretionary, 
allowing a court to impose electronic monitoring on those sex of-
fenders who are determined to be a high risk on an individualized 
basis, but these states vary greatly in how and under what circum-
stances this discretion may be used.  Six states have passed statutes 
that specifically address electronic monitoring and give judges much 
more discretion than the Florida, California, and Massachusetts 
Models.
139
  For example, Arkansas enacted a statute that only applies 
to “a sex offender determined to be a sexually violent predator” and 
requires electronic monitoring on an individual basis “for a period 
not less than ten (10) years” upon release.
140
  The “not less than” lan-
guage in the Arkansas statute indicates that the court may impose a 
longer period of electronic monitoring, depending on the individual-
ized risk assessment. 
In Nevada, the Chief Parole and Probation Officer assesses the 
individual risk that a sex offender poses and has the discretion to 
recommend electronic monitoring for a period up to the offender’s 
natural life.
141
  New Jersey mandates that judges who sentence de-
fendants convicted of certain sexual offenses require lifetime parole 
 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. (noting issues with technology limitations, increased workload of supervi-
sors, lack of actual crime prevention, high costs, and removal of devices by offend-
ers). 
 138 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 139 ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-923 (2011) (effective Apr. 7, 2006); NEV. REV. STAT.  § 
176A.410(1), (2)(b)–(c) (2011) (effective Oct. 1, 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-
6.4(a) (West 2011) (effective Jan. 14, 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.91(c) (West 
2011) (effective Aug. 6, 2007); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 837-r(1), (2)(d) (Consol. 2011) (ef-
fective Apr. 13, 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4) (Consol. 2011) (effective June 22, 
2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-302(b) (2011) (effective July 1, 2004); WASH. REV. 
CODE . § 9.94A.704(5) (2011) (effective Aug. 1, 2009). 
 140 ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-923(a)(1) (2011) (effective Apr. 7, 2006). 
 141 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 176A.410(1), (2)(b)–(c) (2011) (effective Oct. 1, 2007).   
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or community supervision
142
 and then gives judges full discretion to 
impose electronic monitoring as a “condition of discharge.”
143
  New 
York, in 2007, created an Office of Sex Offender Management to as-
sess individualized sex offender risks, and it is within its discretion to 
use electronic monitoring as a “supervisory tool.”
144
  In addition, the 
courts also have discretion to impose electronic monitoring as a con-
dition of probation when it would “advance public safety.”
145
  Tennes-
see and Washington place the responsibility for the individualized 
risk assessment on their respective boards of probation and parole 
and provide the boards with discretion to use electronic monitoring 
on high-risk offenders.
146
 
Other states never get that specific and allow GPS monitoring as 
a general “tool” that courts may implement as they see fit without 
specifying or mandating when it needs to be used with specific statu-
tory guidelines.  There are twelve jurisdictions where a vague elec-
tronic-monitoring condition is one tool that judges or probationary 
boards have within their sole discretion.
147
  Each of these states allow 
some circumstances under which electronic monitoring may be im-
posed on a post-incarceration sex offender without specifying how 
such a tool must be utilized.  The degree of judicial discretion in the-
se states is much higher than under the Florida, California, or Massa-
chusetts Models,
148
 and strict bright-line rules have been avoided in 
favor of judicial flexibility. 
For example, in Colorado, a sex offender who is released on pa-
role is subject to a period of parole that will last at least ten years for 
class four felonies and twenty years for class two or three felonies and 
 
 142 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6.4(a) (West 2011) (effective Jan. 14, 2004). 
 143 Id. § 30:4-123.91(c) (effective Aug. 6, 2007). 
 144 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 837-r(1), (2)(d) (Consol. 2011) (effective Apr. 13, 2007). 
 145 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4) (Consol. 2011) (effective June 22, 2010). 
 146 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-302(b) (2011) (effective July 1, 2004); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9.94A.704(5) (2011) (effective Aug. 1, 2009). 
 147 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(XIV.5) (2011) (effective Mar. 8, 2006); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-30(a)(14) (2011) (effective Oct. 1, 2003); D.C. CODE § 22-
1211 (2011) (effective Dec. 10, 2009); HAW. REV. STAT.  § 353G-7(a)(4)(D) (2011) (ef-
fective July 7, 1998); HAW. REV. STAT.  § 706-624(2)(p) (LexisNexis 2011) (effective 
June 22, 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-84 (2011) (effective July 1, 2007); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 83-174.03 (LexisNexis 2011) (effective Apr. 13, 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
12.1-32-07(3)(f) (2011) (effective Apr. 4, 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.13(L) 
(LexisNexis 2011) (effective Aug. 3, 2006); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9798.3 (2011) (effec-
tive Jan. 1, 2007); TEX.  GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.221 (West 2010) (effective Sept. 1, 
1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1(8)(a)(vi) (2011) (effective Mar. 21, 1995); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 7-13-1102 (2011) (effective July 1, 1996). 
 148 See discussion supra Part II.A–C. 
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will last at most for the rest of the sex offender’s life.
149
  Although the 
statute does not explicitly mandate any form of electronic monitor-
ing, when determining a period of probation, a judge is allowed to 
require the probationer to “[b]e subject to electronic or global posi-
tion monitoring.”
150
  While it is not explicitly stated, the combination 
of various Colorado statutory provision does put the possibility of life-
time electronic monitoring, based entirely on the judge’s discretion, 
in a judge’s toolkit.
151
  Similarly, in Connecticut and Mississippi the 
court may, but need not, impose electronic monitoring as a condition 
of probation.
152
 
Some states, while making vague mention of a possibility of the 
use of GPS tracking, do not specify any guidelines for its utilization.  
In the District of Columbia, for example, a statute makes it unlawful 
for anyone to tamper with a global positioning device that is required 
as a condition of various sentencing options, including probation, 
supervised release, and parole.
153
  At no other point, however, does 
the D.C. Code specify the circumstances under which electronic 
monitoring may be imposed; thus a vague reference to tampering 
implies that a possibility of GPS tracking exists.  Texas also makes a 
vague reference to the possibility of electronic monitoring as a condi-
tion of parole, but does not specify the use of electronic monitoring 
in relation to sex offenses.
154
 
There are also a couple of states that are truly unique in their 
treatment of the issue.  For example, Ohio is unique in that its statute 
applies only to sex offenders who do not serve a prison sentence (ap-
plying to probation-only sentences), and it is within the Ohio courts’ 
discretion to impose the electronic monitoring (it is not mandato-
ry).
155
  Minnesota, while not having authorized GPS tracking for sex 
offenders, does have an electronic-monitoring program for those who 
commit domestic violence.
156
  The statute is limited to crimes “com-
mitted against a family or household member,”
157
 but it does encom-
 
 149 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1006(b) (2011). 
 150 Id. § 18-1.3-204 (2)(a)(XIV.5).   
 151 See id. §§ 18-1.3-1006(b), 18-1.3-204 (2)(a)(XIV.5). 
 152 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-30(a)(14) (2011) (effective May 26, 2006); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 99-19-84 (2011) (effective July 1, 2007). 
 153 D.C. CODE § 22-1211 (2011) (effective Dec. 10, 2009). 
 154 See TEX.  GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.221 (West 2011) (effective Sept. 1, 1997). 
 155 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.13(L) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 156 See MINN. STAT. § 611A.07 (2011) (effective Apr. 30, 1992).   
 157 Id. § 518B.01 (2010). 
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pass “criminal sexual conduct,”
158
 which allows a minimal level of sex-
offender tracking in situations of sexual abuse within the family.
159
 
In summary, a vast majority of states allow some form of elec-
tronic monitoring of sex offenders, but the specific provisions of such 
statutes can vary greatly.  Most of the statutes that differ from the 
Florida, the California, or the Massachusetts Models do so because of 
the degree of judicial or regulatory-agency discretion that they grant, 
but these states still have systems in place to monitor those sex of-
fenders who pose the greatest risks, especially to children.  There are 
forty-two different statutes that in some way allow for sex-offender 
GPS tracking (including in the District of Columbia), and this num-
ber does not even include actions that the federal government has 
taken on this issue. 
E.  The Federal Models 
At the same time when a supermajority of states enacted some 
form of sex-offender tracking legislation, the U.S. Congress entered 
the debate in two different ways: through direct statutory action and 
through state-funding programs.  In 2005, during the public outcry 
over the death of Jessica Lunsford, Congress made its first and only 
official attempt to directly legislate for electronic monitoring of sex 
offenders at the federal level.
160
  Modeled after the Florida statute and 
called the Jessica Lunsford Act, the House bill would have amended 
the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offender Registration Program
161
 in a couple of key ways.
162
  First, it 
would have strengthened the sex-offender registration program by 
requiring states to verify the last known address of sex offenders by 
randomly mailing a verification form at least twice a year.
163
  If the of-
fender did not mail the form back within a predetermined time thus 
verifying the accuracy of his registered address, he would be held lia-
ble as if he had never registered at all.
164
 
Second, and more relevant to this Comment’s discussion, the 
bill would have required electronic monitoring of certain sex offend-
ers who habitually failed to follow their registration requirements for 
at least five years upon release or ten years if they were considered 
 
 158 Id. 
 159 MINN. STAT. § 629.72, subd. 2a (20011) (effective Apr. 30, 1992). 
 160 H.R. 1505, 109th Cong. (2005).   
 161 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006). 
 162 See H.R. 1505. 
 163 Id. § 2(a). 
 164 Id. 
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“violent predators.”
165
  This was a direct federal requirement on the 
states not only to have a program to track registration of sex offend-
ers within their borders but also to implement an enforcement 
mechanism with “location-transmitting device[s]” to verify their 
whereabouts.
166
  Representative Ginny Brown-Waite from Florida in-
troduced this bill in the House on April 6, 2005, along with eighty-six 
co-sponsors (twenty-one Democrats and sixty-five Republicans), but 
the bill never made it out of the House Committee on the Judiciary.
167
  
Although direct federal control of sex-offender tracking never 
came out of congressional committee, another piece of legislation 
had a much larger impact on the issue by tying state action to federal 
grants.  The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 im-
plemented a Sex Offender Monitoring Program that authorized the 
Attorney General to award Jessica Lunsford and Sarah Lunde Grants 
to various state and local governments if they complied with the stat-
ed minimum standards.
168
  These standards required states, at a min-
imum, to set up programs to track sex offenders with active electron-
ic-monitoring devices twenty-four hours a day in order to get a federal 
grant.
169
  The statute authorized $5,000,000 in grants and gave a ma-
jor financial incentive for each state to pass a sex-offender tracking 
statute.
170
 
It is hardly a coincidence that most of the state statutes analyzed 
above were implemented between 2007 and 2009, the period for 
which the state grants were authorized.  Even though a bill that would 
have allowed the federal government to mandate electronic monitor-
ing for sex offenders never made it out of the House of Representa-
tives, the federal government still achieved its goal by providing the 
financial incentive needed to move the states into action where fed-
eral legislation could not be passed.  While legislation requiring some 
form of electronic monitoring of sex offenders has proliferated over 
 
 165 Id. § 2(c). 
 166 Id.  
 167 H.R. 1505 (109th): Jessica Lunsford Act, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hr1505 (last visited June 11, 2012).  Af-
ter a hearing in the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Security on June 9, 2005, movement on the Jessica Lunsford Act ceased because the 
provisions that Congress wished to pass were included in H.R. 4472, the Adam Walsh 
Child Protection and Safety Act.  The provision for federal GPS tracking of sex of-
fenders was not passed and no further efforts for federal tracking of sex offenders 
were  pursued in later sessions. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-749, at 102 (2007). 
 168 See 42 U.S.C. § 16981(a)(1) (2006) (effective July 27, 2006). 
 169 See § 16981(a)(1)(C). 
 170 § 16981(c)(1). 
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the past six years, the statutes for the most part have not faced consti-
tutional review beyond the various challenges to retroactive applica-
tion.
171
  As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found, GPS 
tracking is “dramatically more intrusive and burdensome” when 
compared to registration only.
172
  This Comment will next assess 
whether these statutes go too far in reducing the constitutional rights 
of sex offenders. 
III.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONSTITUTIONALITY 
One of the chief reasons for the Framers to write the Constitu-
tion was to “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Pos-
terity.”
173
 And it is the province of the courts to determine whether or 
not a law is “repugnant to the Constitution” and thus void.
174
  Alt-
hough a majority of states have determined that the individual rights 
of sex offenders are secondary to the safety of society at large,
175
 when 
the government decides to intrude upon the protections that the 
Constitution bestows on all Americans, this determination must ulti-
mately be made by the courts. 
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to determine the consti-
tutionality of GPS tracking of sex offenders, Part III will review some 
of the various constitutional arguments against such statutes.  Part 
III.A will review the argument that retroactive application of the stat-
utes violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
176
  Part 
III.B will review the argument that the long-term or permanent GPS 
tracking of sex offenders violates their freedom of movement, both 
intrastate and interstate.  Part III.C will review the argument that at-
taching GPS-locators to sex offenders’ bodies violates their freedom 
to control their own bodily integrity free from unreasonable govern-
ment intrusion.  Finally, Part III.D will review the argument that a 
tracking device cannot continuously transmit evidence regarding the 
offender’s location for hypothetical future crimes without violating 
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches.
177
 
 
 171 See, e.g., Doe v. Schwarzenegger, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181–82 (E.D. Cal. 
2007); People v. Milligan, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 172 Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 196 (Mass. 2009).   
 173 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 174 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 175 See supra Part II. 
 176 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”).  
 177 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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A. Retroactive Application Violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution 
One issue with sex-offender tracking statutes arises when a state 
attempts to apply a new law to a sex offender who has committed his 
crime before the effective date of the tracking statute.  An ex post fac-
to law is a law that criminalizes behavior that was legal when originally 
committed; the ex post facto prohibition, however, does not apply to 
civil laws enforced retroactively.
178
  Some courts have found that elec-
tronic monitoring requirements violate the Ex Post Facto Clause and 
thus may not be applied retroactively, while other courts have found 
that the laws are non-punitive in nature, and thus, do not violate the 
Ex Post Facto Clause.
179
  The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on 
this issue, but there is already a well-established framework in place to 
make this determination, which the Court used when it found that 
sex offender registration laws did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause 
when applied retroactively.
180
 
In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court entered the debate about 
sex-offender registration and found that the retroactive application of 
registration laws did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause under the 
“well-established” framework for deciding whether or not a law has 
crossed the line from civil proceedings to criminal punishment.
181
  
Under the Court’s guidelines, the first step is to “ascertain whether 
the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings;” if 
the legislature intended to impose the law as a punishment, it would 
“end the inquiry” and any retroactive application would violate the Ex 
Post Facto Clause.
182
  If the Court determines that the legislature in-
tended to enact a civil proceeding or that the legislature’s intent is 
ambiguous, the next step is to analyze whether the statute’s effects on 
 
 178 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004). 
 179 Compare Doe v. Schwarzenegger, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1180–81 (E.D. Cal. 
2007) (holding that the California monitoring statute was only to be applied pro-
spectively and noting that applying it retroactively would “raise serious ex post facto 
concerns”), with Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1000 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
retroactive application of the Tennessee monitoring statute does not violate the Ex 
Post Facto Clause because the statute is non-punitive), and State v. Bare, 677 S.E.2d 
518, 528 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that retroactive application of the North 
Carolina monitoring statute does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it is a 
civil regulatory scheme and no more punitive than sex-offender registration). 
 180 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003) (holding that Alaska’s sex offend-
er registration statute was a non-punitive civil regulatory scheme and, therefore, ret-
roactive application did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause). 
 181 Id. at 92. 
 182 Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
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the individual are punitive under the seven-factor Mendoza-Martinez 
test.
183
 
The Mendoza-Martinez test, under which the Court determines 
whether the sanctions that a statute imposes are punitive in nature, 
asks: (1) whether the statute imposes “an affirmative disability or re-
straint,” (2) whether the sanction imposed has traditionally been re-
garded as a punishment, (3) whether the sanction is imposed only 
upon a showing of scienter,
184
 (4) whether the sanction promotes retri-
bution and deterrence, (5) whether the sanction applies to behavior 
that was already a crime, (6) whether a separate, rationally related 
purpose can be attributed to the sanctions aside from punishment, 
and (7) whether the sanction seems excessive in relation to the alter-
native purpose attributed to the statute.
185
  While this list is “neither 
exhaustive nor dispositive,”
186
 the Supreme Court applied the Mendo-
za-Martinez test when it determined the constitutionality of imposing 
sex-offender registration requirements retroactively, and thus it is a 
fair assumption that the same analysis applies to sex-offender tracking 
statutes as well.
187
 
Although the explicit legislative intent for enacting a sex-
offender tracking statute is not always stated, it is likely that when the 
Supreme Court does face this issue, even if the legislative intent is 
stated, it will not be alone dispositive one way or the other.  For ex-
ample, in the text of the Colorado tracking statute, the legislature 
explicitly stated that “continued monitoring of sex offenders at each 
stage of the criminal justice system . . . will curtail recidivistic behavior 
and the protection of victims and potential victims will be en-
hanced.”
188
  This, on its face, would probably be classified as a “civil 
regulatory scheme” because the goal is not to punish the offenders 
but rather to protect the potential victims; this is the same legislative 
 
 183 See id. at 97 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 
(1963)). 
 184 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (8th ed. 2004) (“A degree of knowledge that 
makes a person legally responsible for the consequences of his act or omission; the 
fact of an act’s having been done knowingly, esp. as a ground for civil damages or 
criminal punishment.” (emphasis added)). 
 185 Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168–69. 
 186 Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 187 See id. 
 188 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11.7-101 (2010) (repealed 2011) (stating that the legisla-
tive intent in passing the statute was to reduce recidivism threats).  The legislature 
changed this language only one year later, clarifying that “[t]he general assembly 
does not intend to imply that all offenders can or will positively respond to treat-
ment.”  COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11.7-101(2) (2011). 
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goal that the Supreme Court deemed “civil” in Smith.
189
  The true de-
termination of whether or not sex-offender tracking statutes are pu-
nitive in nature will be based on the Mendoza-Martinez review. 
Unlike registration requirements, however, the Court could still 
very easily find that requiring an offender to wear a GPS-tracking de-
vice for an extended period is punitive in nature under the Mendoza-
Martinez analysis.  Offenders are forbidden to go near certain areas, 
such as anywhere where “children congregate,”
190
 which constantly 
requires them to plan their paths ahead of time to ensure that they 
will not pass by a school, a playground, or a shopping mall and face 
harsh punishments.  Such broad statutory limitations on movement 
are definitely affirmative restraints on how an offender can live his 
life.
191
  Unlike registration requirements—under which members of 
the public must actively seek out the information whether someone is 
a sex offender—electronic monitoring requires that a sex offender 
have a device on the outermost layer of clothing, which makes the 
device visible to the public wherever he goes.
192
  As public awareness 
of sex-offender-tracking requirements grows, these devices may very 
well become “modern day ‘scarlet letter[s]’” that expose the offender 
to public shame and hostility—a sanction that has traditionally been 
regarded as punishment.
193
 
An alternative justification for sex-offender tracking is reducing 
sex-offender recidivism,
194
 but this is not likely to sway the Supreme 
Court to allow retroactive application of such requirements because 
long-term or lifetime GPS tracking is excessive in relation to that 
purpose.  Such sanctions do not prevent crimes, but merely give the 
police an active source of evidence to solve crimes after-the-fact.
195
  
Sex-offender registration was found, under the Mendoza-Martinez test, 
 
 189 See Smith, 538 U.S. at 93. 
 190 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.30(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 191 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 192 See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 193 Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1009 (6th Cir. 2007) (Keith, J., dissenting in 
part). 
 194 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11.7-101 (2010). 
 195 See IND. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 128 (noting that a major negative aspect of 
GPS monitoring is the “[c]reation of a false sense of security because GPS monitor-
ing does not prevent crimes from happening.” (emphasis added)).  Real-time tracking 
of a sex offender may act as a deterrent because the offender knows that he can be 
traced, but it cannot actually prevent crimes from occurring because it is impossible 
to know what the offender is doing at a given moment even if the police knew his lo-
cation.  Thus, the only practical effect of GPS-tracking statutes is to provide evidence 
of location after the fact or the hope that the sex offender will be less likely to com-
mit crimes if he knows that the state is following him. 
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to be a non-punitive civil regulation, but sex-offender-tracking stat-
utes interfere with the rights of the offenders to a much greater ex-
tent and have much more permanent punitive effect on these rights.  
If the Court does find that these statutes have a punitive effect, retro-
active application would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Even pro-
spective application after the effective date of the statute, however, 
could be unconstitutional if the laws go too far. 
B.  Sex-Offender Tracking Statutes Unreasonably Restrict Freedom of 
Movement 
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether sex-offender 
tracking statutes infringe on an offender’s freedom of movement.  
Wearing a GPS tracking device for decades, or even for the course of 
his life, does not directly inhibit an offender’s movement, but the is-
sue is more complex.  Under the broad concept of “personal liberty,” 
the Supreme Court has recognized that a person has a right to travel 
throughout the country “uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations 
that unreasonably burden or restrict this movement”
196
 and that the 
freedom to move without government interference is “a virtually un-
conditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us 
all.”
197
 
1.  Intrastate Freedom of Movement 
These statutes directly interfere with the freedom of movement 
by prohibiting offenders from entering designated exclusionary 
zones.  The Wisconsin statute is a good example of these exclusionary 
provisions.  It sets specific areas where the offender may not go, fo-
cusing on “areas where children congregate, with perimeters of 100 
to 250 feet.”
198
  Such exclusions are similar to a restraining order and 
can encompass other areas, including the “victim’s residence, place 
of employment and school.”
199
  These zones, set out at the time when 
probation is enacted, are the only explicit restrictions to the offend-
er’s freedom of movement.  Thus even under the personal liberty test 
in Saenz v. Roe, these would likely pass judicial review as reasonable 
limitations because a person who commits any sexual act with a child 
should not be able to knowingly go where children congregate just as 
 
 196 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618, 629 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 197 Id. at 498 (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 643) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).   
 198 WIS. STAT. § 301.48(3)(c) (2011). 
 199 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 127, § 133D1/2 (2011). 
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a person who sexually assaults another person should not be able to 
approach the victim when he is let out of prison.  This does not 
acknowledge, however, the other incidental ways that the tracked of-
fender’s freedom of movement is impacted by GPS-tracking statutes. 
Judicial review of GPS-tracking statutes has not yet reached the 
Supreme Court, but there have been cases in the lower courts that 
have challenged the statutes’ validity.  In 2007, for example, a sex of-
fender challenged Tennessee’s Monitoring Act on various grounds.
200
  
One of the grounds was that it “ha[d] a marked effect on his lifestyle 
and freedom of movement.”
201
  The offender, Doe, explained that he 
was “required to carry with him at all times when not at his residence 
a relatively large box that contains the electronics necessary for the 
monitoring to take place.”
202
  He had to wear the tracking device on 
the outside of his outermost layer of clothing that was “obvious to any 
onlooker.”
203
 
Doe was burdened in ways other than the visibility of the track-
ing box.  If he was going into any building, he would need to wait 
several minutes before entering to allow the device to reset.
204
  Once 
inside the building, Doe would need to exit the building “at least 
once every hour so that monitoring could take place.”
205
  In addition, 
as in Thissell, Doe was forbidden to “swim or participate in any other 
water activity” because the device was not waterproof.
206
  GPS tracking 
also made taking a bath impossible due to its limitations.
207
 
In addition to the incidental restrictions on Doe’s movements, 
Doe experienced additional burdens due to device malfunctions.
208
  
Doe went on a vacation after receiving permission from the authori-
ties, and because the device was not transmitting properly, he was re-
peatedly threatened with immediate arrest if he did not call in to the 
probation officer.
209
  This was just one of the many times in the two 
years that Doe was required to wear the GPS tracker that the device 
malfunctioned, causing extreme inconvenience.
210
  Although the ap-
 
 200 Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1001–02 (6th Cir. 2007).   
 201 Id. at 1002.  
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id.   
 205 Id. 
 206 Doe, 507 F.3d at 1002.  
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. 
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peals court found that these limitations were not “punitive” in nature, 
Doe’s description of the day-to-day effect of living with a GPS monitor 
is instructive; he would have to consider whether or not the state 
would allow him to go where he wanted to go and worry about 
whether a device malfunction would get him arrested. 
Judge Keith’s partial dissent in Bredesen cautioned that the re-
quirement to always carry a visible tracking box with him exposed 
Doe to public scorn.
211
  By contrast, the majority opinion found that 
members of the public would not know what the GPS tracking device 
was, and even if they did, they would not know that such a device des-
ignated the person wearing it as a sex offender.
212
  However true the 
majority’s point may have been in 2007, public knowledge and per-
ception of GPS tracking devices will change as almost every jurisdic-
tion has passed sex-offender tracking statutes, which will change the 
reality in line with the dissent’s point of view.
213
 
Judge Keith considered the “relatively large box as a symbol of 
[Doe’s] crime for all to see,” arguing that it had the effect of a “mod-
ern day ‘scarlet letter.’”
214
  Judge Keith went on to reflect that forcing 
a sex offender to wear the GPS-tracking box anywhere he went “[wa]s 
dangerously close to having a law enforcement officer openly escort-
ing him to every place he [chose] to visit for all [the general public] 
to see, but without the ability to prevent him from re-offending.”
215
 As 
these statutes proliferate and public awareness of GPS tracking of sex 
offenders increases with time, sex offenders will be faced with increas-
ing scorn from the public when they venture out of their homes.  Un-
like registration laws, in the case of which the sex offender only wor-
ries about facing those members of the public who actively seek out 
his sex-offender status and actually recognize him, a tracked sex of-
fender worries about anyone who may suspect that the GPS-tracker 
designates him as a high-risk sex offender.
216
 
 
 211 Id. at 1008–09 (Keith, J., dissenting in part). 
 212 Bredesen, 507 F.3d at 1005 (majority opinion).   
 213 See, e.g., Brian Joseph, GPS Units Fail to Protect Public from Sex Offenders, ORANGE 
CNTY. REG. (June 18, 2010 3:00 AM), 
http://taxdollars.ocregister.com/2010/06/18/gps-units-fail-to-protect-public-from-
sex-offenders/59253/ (giving an overview of the California tracking statute and 
providing an example of the increased coverage that GPS tracking of sex offenders 
has received since 2007). 
 214 Bredesen, 507 F.3d at 1009 (Keith, J., dissenting in part). 
 215 Id. at 1012.   
 216 But cf. United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 610 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that forcing a man convicted of stealing mail to stand outside a post office wearing a 
signboard stating that he stole mail was an allowable form of public shaming). 
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Although not a direct restriction on the offender’s freedom of 
movement, the possibility of public scorn and hostility is definitely an 
incidental restriction on a sex offender’s ability to move freely within 
the state in which he lives.  If the government forces an offender to 
permanently wear a tracking device, which causes the offender to 
face fear, apprehension, anger, or outright hostility every time he 
leaves his home, it cannot truly be said that his freedom of movement 
is not infringed.  As knowledge of the “scarlet letter” device hooked 
to an offender’s belt increases, the sex-offender-tracking statute will 
eventually lead to state-sponsorship of two classes of citizens: those 
who can travel freely, and those who can only leave their homes if 
they are willing to face public condemnation.
217
 
2.  Interstate Freedom of Movement 
Another fundamental right articulated in Saenz is the right to 
travel freely between states.
218
  Some states, such as Montana, deal 
with interstate considerations explicitly in their statutes.
219
  In Mon-
tana, if a tracked offender is allowed to “transfer supervision to an-
other state,” he must “pay a fee of $50 to cover the cost of processing 
the transfer.”
220
  This implies that if the offender wishes to exercise his 
fundamental right to travel between states, he can only do so if he 
first gets permission from the monitoring body, pays a $50 transfer 
fee, and the new state is willing to take over tracking responsibilities.  
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court, when proclaiming such a fun-
damental right, intended for the right to be subject to the bureaucra-
cy of two state governments.  The statute also does not clarify what 
would happen if an offender who is tracked wants to move to a state 
that does not impose GPS tracking for sex offenders.  Nor does it deal 
with the jurisdictional issues that could possibly come from a GPS 
tracking device transmitting location data to the home state even 
when the offender is no longer within the jurisdictional boundary of 
that state. 
Some sex-offender-tracking statutes make reference to the Inter-
state Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS), an interstate 
 
 217 See, e.g., Demleitner, supra note 6, at 158–59 (explaining how post-conviction 
restrictions can push ex-offenders into a realm of second-class citizenship). 
 218 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999).   
 219 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-1031(1)(b) (2011).   
 220 Id. 
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effort to monitor sex-offender risks.
221
  One of the main purposes of 
the ICAOS, as the enacting statutes indicate, is to “[p]rovide for the 
effective tracking, supervision, and rehabilitation of these [sex] of-
fenders by the sending and receiving states.”
222
  All fifty states and the 
District of Columbia are members of the ICAOS.
223
  This should be 
the interstate agency to coordinate transfers of sex offenders current-
ly being tracked by their original states, but it is unclear whether 
ICAOS has an efficient process in place to safeguard offenders’ free-
dom of interstate movement not only when they are moving to an-
other state but also when they are just crossing into a neighboring 
state for a temporary trip. 
If the states are going to condition the exercise of an offender’s 
right of interstate movement on the states’ approval, then there 
needs to be an efficient process in place that will accomplish that in 
the least-restrictive way possible.  If states are going to restrict inter-
state movement even for day-trips into neighboring states, then it is 
likely impossible for the bureaucracies of two different states to make 
the process efficient enough to make it practical for the offender to 
even try to get permission unless he knows at least a week in advance 
that he will need to travel out of his home state.  In situations where a 
sex offender lives on the border of two different states and could pos-
sibly be employed or have family across the border, GPS-tracking 
statutes could truly become burdensome on the offender’s freedom 
of interstate movement, and this aspect of sex-offender tracking stat-
utes could be held unconstitutional. 
C. Sex-Offender Tracking Statutes Unreasonably Interfere with 
Offenders’ Bodily Integrity 
The Supreme Court has also yet to deal with the question 
whether requiring a sex offender to wear a GPS unit on his body for 
the rest of his natural life unreasonably interferes with his bodily in-
tegrity.  There are two different ways that the Supreme Court could 
find such interference, and this section will discuss both in turn.  
First, these statutes require that a sex offender wear a permanent 
tracking device on his body.  Second, as the technology of GPS track-
 
 221 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.1243(2)(b) (2011) (“Lifetime supervision 
shall be deemed a form of parole for . . . [t]he purposes of the Interstate Compact 
for Adult Offender Supervision . . . .”).   
 222 WIS. STAT. § 304.16(1)(a)(2) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 223 State and Region Maps—ICAOS Directory, INTERSTATE COMM’N ADULT OFFENDER 
SUPERVISION, http://www.interstatecompact.org/Directory/ RegionsStates.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2011).   
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ing devices gets smaller and more efficient, it is possible that these 
tracking devices, which are currently only attached to the exterior of 
the offender’s body, break the skin and be permanently implanted in 
the offender’s body. 
1. Freedom of Bodily Integrity from Unreasonable 
Government Intrusion 
The Supreme Court has not yet dealt with state action that inter-
feres with the exterior of one’s body in the way that a permanent GPS 
tracker does, but it has addressed state action that interferes with a 
person’s right to be “secure in [his] person[]” from state action.
224
  In 
Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court considered whether a po-
lice officer’s order that a hospital take a blood sample from a drunk 
driver without his consent violated his personal liberty.
225
  After reject-
ing the argument that the “Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment requires the human body in all circumstances to be held 
inviolate against state expeditions seeking evidence of [a] crime,” the 
Court went on to explore whether such action violated Schmerber’s 
Fourth Amendment right to be secure in his person.
226
  This was the 
Court’s first analysis of a search inside one’s body, and its starting 
point was whether the government’s violation of Schmerber’s bodily 
integrity to search for evidence “[was] justified in the circumstances, 
or [was] made in an improper manner.”
227
 
The Court found that when the police are searching a person’s 
body and are not authorized by previous exceptions to the warrant 
requirement (e.g., a search incident to a lawful arrest
228
 or a Terry 
“stop and frisk” search for weapons to protect officer safety),
229
 “[t]he 
interests in human dignity and privacy [that] the Fourth Amendment 
protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired 
evidence might be obtained.”
230
  Even though the blood test involved 
a search “beyond the body’s surface,”
231
 the same Fourth Amendment 
 
 224 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 225 384 U.S. 757, 758 (1966).  
 226 Id. at 767.   
 227 Id. at 768.   
 228 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (establishing the “search 
incident to a lawful arrest” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant require-
ment, allowing a limited search of a person when lawfully arrested to look for weap-
ons). 
 229 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1968) (allowing an officer to conduct a 
limited frisk of a suspect when there is reasonable suspicion that he may be armed). 
 230 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769–70.   
 231 See discussion infra Part III.C.2. 
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protections would apply to GPS-tracking.  Much like the blood test in 
Schmerber, the constant flow of information that the GPS tracker pro-
vides to police is primarily used as evidence of possible wrongdoing.  
And the blood sample in Schmerber was used to provide evidence 
about a drunk-driving accident that had already occurred; the connec-
tion between the warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment 
and monitoring through a GPS tracking device is even less clear 
where the police are gathering evidence from a sex offender’s body 
based on the possibility that a crime may be committed in the future. 
The Supreme Court found that “[i]n the absence of a clear indi-
cation that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental 
human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evi-
dence may disappear unless there is an immediate search.”
232
  No 
matter how high the risk of recidivism is with a sex offender, the po-
lice will seldom be able to determine when a crime will be commit-
ted, if ever.  Also, unlike the momentary bodily violation that the 
blood test in Schmerber represented, the long-term tracking of a sex 
offender represents a constant government infringement on the of-
fender’s body in the interest of obtaining evidence for a hypothetical 
future crime.  Under Schmerber, the Supreme Court should find that 
this is an unreasonable infringement of the “fundamental human in-
terest” that a person has over his own body. 
In the majority of the state sex-offender-tracking statutes, an in-
dividualized risk assessment is not necessary and tracking is imposed 
categorically based on the crime committed.
233
  In these circumstanc-
es, the government’s ability to justify the infringement of a person’s 
rights to his own body to get possible evidence of a future crime is 
precarious at best.  In United States v. Polouizzi, the district court first 
found that even requiring the wearing of a GPS tracker while a per-
son is awaiting trial is a greater infringement of individual liberty 
than it appears at first glance.234  The court then held that even 
though the government interest in protecting children is significant, 
“a per se rule that the governmental interest always outweighs the con-
stitutional right of liberty denies due process.”
235
  When a state impos-
es a mandatory electronic-monitoring statute on an entire class of 
criminals without an individual risk assessment, the state is making a 
judgment that the governmental interest automatically outweighs all 
 
 232 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. 
 233 See discussion supra Part II.A–C. 
 234  697 F. Supp. 2d 381, 392–93 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).   
 235 Id.   
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of those individuals’ rights to their own bodies, regardless of whether 
individual circumstances would indicate otherwise. 
Under the court’s rationale in Polouizzi, a per se application of 
GPS-tracking requirements without any individualized risk assessment 
would deny the individual’s liberty without due process.  These are 
devices that, while not surgically attached to the outside of an offend-
er’s body, must be worn on a person’s body for his entire life to help 
prevent, or at least provide evidence of, future crimes.  Such an 
“[a]ssessment of the risk of future crime by particular individuals at 
this state of our knowledge is hazardous and fraught with uncertain-
ty.”
236
  In Schmerber, the Court held that because there was probable 
cause to arrest the drunk driver even without the blood sample, such 
a minor intrusion into the body to collect evidence that would have 
disappeared with time was reasonable to protect evidence of a 
crime.
237
  With GPS trackers, however, such intrusion to the exterior 
of one’s body cannot be justified by probable cause that a crime will 
be committed prospectively.  Given the rationale behind Schmerber 
and Polouizzi, if a state wants to violate an offender’s bodily rights with 
a GPS tracking device, such actions should only result from an indi-
vidualized risk assessment if these statutes are to survive constitutional 
review.  Currently, as discussed in Part II, the majority of states do not 
provide for such individualized review. 
2. Technological Advances in Tracking Technologies 
Schmerber dealt with a minor intrusion under the body’s surface 
to collect blood and does not directly apply to analysis of external 
tracking devices, but the technology for internal GPS tracking is on 
the horizon.  In Bredesen, the majority justified the inconvenience of 
wearing a GPS tracker based on the fact that it was the same size as a 
walkie-talkie and would “only become smaller and less cumbersome 
as technology progresses.”
238
  GPS tracking devices smaller than the 
six-inch device that Doe wore in 2007 are already on the market,
239
 
and there are also potential devices that could be planted under a 
 
 236 Id. at 392.   
 237 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–71. 
 238 Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1005 (6th Cir. 2007).   
 239 See Spark Nano Real-Time GPS Tracking Device, BRICKHOUSE SECURITY, 
http://www.brickhousesecurity.com/covert-small-gps-tracking-device.html (last visit-
ed Apr. 20, 2012) (selling a GPS tracking device smaller than the palm of one’s hand 
for less than $200).  
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person’s skin
240
—a much greater invasion of an offender’s rights to 
his body than the external device in Bredesen caused. 
As early as 2003, Applied Digital Solutions, Inc. patented and 
tested “the first-ever subdermal GPS ‘personal location device’ 
(PLD).”
241
  This device was 2.5 inches long by 1.5 inches wide, and the 
company reported that the device could ultimately be approximately 
one-half to one-tenth of that size.
242
  This technology is currently not 
as readily available as the company’s report in 2003 would have indi-
cated, but it is a prime example of the direction in which this tech-
nology is headed.  Not surprisingly, Applied Digital Solution’s report 
focused on the positive uses of such a device,
243
 but there is nothing in 
the current sex-offender statutes that prevents such implantable 
technology from being forced on sex offenders as a condition of their 
release.  In fact, many of the statutes allow for technological ad-
vancement by requiring the use of GPS or other equivalent technolo-
gies.
244
  The courts will likely be forced, at some point, to consider the 
propriety of sub-dermal GPS tracking device. 
While the Schmerber Court allowed a forced test as a minimal in-
fringement of individual’s bodily rights, the Supreme Court has al-
ready denied more intrusive methods of evidence-gathering.  In Win-
ston v. Lee, the Court considered a state’s effort to force a burglar to 
undergo surgery for the removal of a bullet that would have almost 
certainly provided evidence of his guilt.
245
  The Court held that “[a] 
compelled surgical intrusion into an individual’s body for evi-
dence . . . implicates expectations of privacy and security of such 
magnitude that the intrusion may be ‘unreasonable’ even if likely to 
produce evidence of a crime.”
246
  The Court did leave the “reasona-
bleness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin . . . [to be determined 
by a] case-by-case approach.”
247
 This indicates that the Court’s deter-
mination ultimately comes down to a balancing test based on the in-
 
 240 Implantable RFID and GPS Devices, FUTUREPUNDIT (May 26, 2003), 
http://www.futurepundit.com/archives/001299.html.   
 241 Id. 
 242 Id.  
 243 Id. (noting the positive uses of avoidance of kidnapping and the benefits for 
other “high-risk” situations). 
 244 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-302(b)(1)(A) (2010) (allowing GPS device or 
“other location tracking technology”); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (2010) (allowing 
GPS device “or other similar device”).   
 245 470 U.S. 753, 755–56 (1985).   
 246 Id. at 759.  
 247 Id. at 760. 
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dividual circumstances of the search.
248
  But the fact that Supreme 
Court opposed the surgical removal of an item that evidenced an al-
ready committed crime indicates that the Court would likely be even 
less sympathetic to allowing the implantation of a sub-dermal GPS 
device when the device provides evidence for possible future crimes.  
Even if the technological market develops internal GPS tracking de-
vices, states should avoid using them for sex-offender tracking in or-
der to stay within the bounds of Supreme Court precedent.  In addi-
tion, each state’s statute should incorporate an explicit limitation to 
the use of sub-dermal technology. 
D. Freedom from Unreasonable Searches 
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to limit the govern-
ment’s power and “to forever secure the people,
249
 their persons,
250
 
houses,
251
 papers
252
 and effects,
253
 against all unreasonable searches 
and seizures under the guise of law.”
254
  One of the most significant 
arguments against the GPS-tracking statutes is that they violate the 
Fourth Amendment
255
 by providing the police with the wearer’s loca-
tion even when the person is constitutionally protected areas, such as 
his home.  This is an issue that the Supreme Court has considered in 
detail although not within the direct circumstances of a sex-offender 
tracking statute.  In United States v. Katz, the Court decided that a key 
tenet of Fourth Amendment analysis is that “[w]hat a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”
256
  Yet “what he seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.”
257
  Katz dealt with the electronic eaves-
 
 248 See, e.g., Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966) (“[T]he Fourth Amend-
ment’s proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against 
intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an im-
proper manner.”). 
 249 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1171 (8th ed. 2004) (defining people as “the citizens 
of a state as represented by the prosecution in a criminal case”).   
 250 Id. at 1178 (defining person as “the living body of a human being”).    
 251 Id. at 756 (defining house as “a home, dwelling, or residence”).  
 252 Id. at 1142 (defining paper as “any written or printed document or instru-
ment”).    
 253 Id. at 554 (defining effects as “movable property” and “goods”).    
 254 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).   
 255 The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).   
 256 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).   
 257 Id. 
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dropping of a suspect through a device attached to the exterior of a 
phone booth.
258
  The Court held that Katz had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy within the phone booth and that the government vio-
lated that right by collecting evidence without a warrant.
259
 
The Court did emphasize in Katz that a state entity may use an 
electronic device “‘for the narrow and particularized purpose of as-
certaining the truth of the . . . allegations’ of a ‘detailed factual affi-
davit alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense.”
260
  A GPS 
tracking device placed on a sex offender is not transmitting infor-
mation pursuant to a warrant founded on probable cause.  In addi-
tion, it transmits location information based on a possibility of some 
future crime.  A crime that has yet to be committed cannot meet the 
Katz requirement for a warrant exception that such electronic in-
fringement of a person’s expectation of privacy be based on a specific 
criminal offense. 
The Supreme Court has considered the use of electronic moni-
toring equipment to gather evidence against a criminal suspect in 
other contexts as well.  Two other cases concerning electronic moni-
toring of property are relevant to the tracking of a person’s body
261
 
because the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply not only to 
a person’s effects, but also, if not more strictly, to his person.
262
 
The first case, United States v. Knotts, involved the use of an elec-
tronic “beeper” to track a drum of chloroform to the defendant’s 
cabin where drug manufacturing was conducted.
263
  The defendants 
challenged the use of the beeper, which led to the discovery of in-
criminating evidence, as an infringement of their Fourth Amend-
ment rights.
264
  The majority opinion relied on the test articulated in 
Justice Harlan’s Katz concurrence.
265
  This two-part test looks at (1) 
“whether the individual, by his conduct, has ‘exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy’ . . . [and (2)] whether the indi-
 
 258 Id. at 348. 
 259 Id. at 355–57.   
 260 Id. at 355 (quoting Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 329–30 (1966)) 
(emphasis added). 
 261 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983); United States v. Karo, 468 
U.S. 705, 708 (1984). 
 262 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 263 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.   
 264 Id.   
 265 Id. at 280–81 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
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vidual’s subjective expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as “reasonable.’”
266
 
Under this test, the Court held that the defendants did not have 
any reasonable expectation of privacy when the car carrying the drum 
was driving on public roads not only because a person has a lesser 
expectation of privacy while in an automobile but also because a per-
son’s location is in the public view.
267
  This allowed the admission of 
all tracking information gathered while the truck was on the public 
roadways.
268
  Once within private property, however, Knotts was enti-
tled to a reasonable expectation of privacy against any information 
the beeper gave to the police.
269
  The Court noted that “[t]he right of 
officers to thrust themselves into a home is also of grave concern, not 
only to the individual, but to a society that chooses to dwell in rea-
sonable security and freedom from surveillance.”
270
 
Further, the Court in Knotts stated that “[w]hen the right of pri-
vacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be de-
cided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforce-
ment agent.”
271
  The Supreme Court has already held that the use of a 
GPS tracking device on a person’s vehicle and the use of that device 
to track the vehicle’s movement is a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment,
272
 and it is likely that this rationale would extend to a 
device placed on a person’s body. Thus, when a sex-offender statute 
requires imposition of electronic monitoring without individualized 
risk assessment, it is the state legislators, rather than a judicial officer, 
who are deciding that the individual’s rights must yield to a search.  
Even if the wearing of a GPS tracking device is a search, however, 
Knotts does not forbid the gathering of location information when 
the offender is in a public area where his location is open to public 
view.  But using GPS tracking devices in private areas, on the other 
hand, is much more problematic in light of the Court’s more recent 
precedent.   
United States v. Karo was the Court’s first case to specifically ad-
dress whether an electronic monitoring device can provide evidence 
 
 266 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (internal citations omitted).   
 267 Id. at 281–82.   
 268 Id. 
 269 Id. at 282. 
 270 Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)) (emphasis add-
ed). 
 271 Id. (emphasis added).   
 272 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012).   
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when used in a protected area.
273
  In Karo, DEA agents placed an elec-
tronic beeper in a can of ether with the consent of the can’s owner 
and pursuant to court authorization.
274
  The agents then proceeded 
to track the can of ether after Karo picked it up and brought it into 
his house.
275
  Using the beeper technology, the agents continued to 
track the can of ether as it was moved to another defendant’s house, 
and eventually to a commercial storage facility.
276
  Although none of 
the information obtained while the beeper was in public view violated 
the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights, the Court held that “the 
monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open to 
visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those 
who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence.”
277
 
The basic principle reaffirmed in Karo is that “private residences 
are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of 
governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expec-
tation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifia-
ble.”
278
  Such searches are “presumptively unreasonable absent exi-
gent circumstances.”
279
  Even more relevant to this Comment, the 
Court rejected the Government’s argument “that it should be com-
pletely free from the constraints of the Fourth Amendment to deter-
mine by means of an electronic device, without a warrant and without 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whether a particular arti-
cle—or a person, for that matter—is in an individual’s home at a par-
ticular time.”
280
 
Recently, the Court applied this principle specifically to the use 
of GPS technology in United States v. Jones.
281
  In Jones, the Court de-
cided “whether the attachment of a [GPS] tracking device to an indi-
vidual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the ve-
hicle’s movements on public streets, constitutes a search or seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”
282
  The government 
argued that attaching a GPS device to the exterior of Jones’s Jeep, 
 
 273 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984).   
 274 Id.  
 275 Id.   
 276 Id.   
 277 Id. at 714.   
 278 Id.   
 279 Karo, 468 U.S. at 714–15 (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748–49 
(1984)).   
 280 Id. at 716 (emphasis added). 
 281 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012). 
 282 Id. at 948. 
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which was constantly in public view, is not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.
283
  The Court disagreed, holding that “[b]y attaching 
the device to the Jeep, officers encroached on a protected area.”
284
  
Even though this decision deals with a GPS device placed on a vehicle 
and not a person, the case extends the Court’s previous Fourth 
Amendment precedents to GPS-tracking technology.
285
 
When a sex offender enters his home, or another private area, 
the tracking device continues to reveal his location.
286
  The Supreme 
Court has explicitly stated that such monitoring, in areas where the 
offender has a reasonable expectation of privacy, violates the Fourth 
Amendment “absent exigent circumstances.”
287
  The exigent circum-
stances required for an exception to the court’s ruling in Karo simply 
do not apply when an offender is going to be tracked for an extended 
period of time under a sex-offender-tracking statute.  When the gov-
ernment receives location data from a tracking device while the 
wearer is in a protected area, such as his home, it is a violation of the 
wearer’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR CONSTITUTIONALITY 
As shown in Part III, there are a few major arguments against the 
constitutionality of sex-offender tracking statutes.
288
  New technolo-
gies, such as GPS tracking devices, are testing the fundamental pro-
tections of the Constitution in ways that the Framers never could have 
envisioned.  Until the Supreme Court reviews this new area of statu-
tory development specifically,
289
 courts and circuits throughout the 
country will be entitled to independently decide whether to uphold 
such laws.  This is a difficult decision because, notwithstanding the 
various arguments that attack the constitutionality of sex-offender 
tracking, there are also various legal arguments to defend the consti-
tutionality of such statutes.  Part IV will address some of the strongest 
justifications for the constitutionality of sex-offender tracking statutes 
 
 283 Id. at 952. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. at 951–52. 
 286 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 16981(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2006) (setting a minimum standard 
for any state requesting a federal grant for setting up a sex offender monitoring pro-
gram to utilize a device that “permit[s] active, real-time, and continuous monitoring 
of offenders 24 hours a day”). 
 287 Karo, 468 U.S. at 714–15.   
 288 See discussion supra Part III. 
 289 The Court’s holding in Jones is limited to the placement of a GPS tracking de-
vice on a vehicle and does not directly address sex-offender GPS-tracking statutes.  See 
supra notes 281–85 and accompanying text. 
DANTE_ FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  10:51 AM 
1210 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1169 
and review the counter-arguments to the arguments discussed in Part 
III. 
Part IV.A will review the argument that, since the Fourth 
Amendment only applies to unreasonable searches and seizures,
290
 it 
does not apply to sex-offender tracking statutes at all because they are 
a reasonable application of government authority.  Part IV.B will re-
view restrictions of rights based on a judgment that an individual is a 
“danger to society” and how such precedent is applicable given the 
danger that sex offenders pose to society.  Finally, Part IV.C will re-
view the argument that because probationers and parolees have re-
duced rights due to their prior crimes, especially when dealing with 
searches that would not otherwise be constitutional, none of the ar-
guments analyzed in Part III apply to sex-offender-tracking statutes. 
A. Sex-Offender Tracking is a Reasonable Search Under the Fourth 
Amendment 
One of the most significant arguments against the constitutional-
ity of these searches asserts that such constant location monitoring 
violates the offender’s Fourth Amendment rights.
291
  Even assuming 
that using the information from an active tracking device to verify an 
offender’s location within his residence is a search under the Fourth 
Amendment, such searches may not violate the Fourth Amendment if 
the court determines that the intrusion is “reasonable.”
292
  Although 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly found that “searches and seizures 
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable,”
293
 
the Court has also found in various cases that “because the ultimate 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the war-
rant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.”
294
  The Court has 
gone on to find that “[a]n action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth 
Amendment . . . ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justi-
fy [the] action.’”
295
  Although the Fourth Amendment generally re-
quires a warrant for searches of a person’s home, under the standard 
articulated in United States v. Knights, “a lesser degree satisfies the 
 
 290 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 291 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 292 See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 293 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). 
 294 Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403 (quoting Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 
(1999)).   
 295 Id. at 404 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (emphasis add-
ed)).   
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Constitution when the balance of governmental and private interests 
makes such a standard reasonable.”
296
 
Given the strong government interest in protecting children 
from sexual predators, there is a compelling argument that the gov-
ernment interest outweighs the individual’s privacy interests when 
sex-offender tracking statutes are in question.  This type of legislation 
attempts to monitor sex offenders after they are released from jail; 
thus the primary purpose of sex-offender tracking statutes is to “best 
protect the public from the risk that the individual will reoffend.”
297
  
GPS tracking can only be implemented on someone who has already 
committed a sexual crime because there would be no way to identify 
a sex offender before he has committed a sex crime.  Because of this, 
electronic monitoring is completely focused on the risk of recidivism 
and the fear that registration alone does not protect society sufficient-
ly.
298
  Thus, the Knights balancing test requires an examination wheth-
er the government’s interest in reducing sex-offender recidivism is 
warranted when compared to the recidivism threat of other crimes.
299
 
An individual risk assessment of a sex offender is a rather inexact 
science; the best available indicators of recidivism risks are statistical 
models that provide data on general groupings of sex offenders.
300
  
Such statistics can differ depending on a wide range of variables, but 
referring to the statistics that the judicial system uses is valuable be-
cause probably similar statistics will be utilized under any “reasona-
bleness” analysis of the government interest.  The most recent sex-
offender recidivism study was conducted by the U.S. Department of 
Justice and the Bureau of Justice Statistics in 2003, and followed 9,691 
male sex offenders that were released in 1994 by fifteen different 
states.
301
  This is the most recent government study on recidivism and 
various courts have cited it.
302
   
 
 296 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001). 
 297 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-174.03(3) (2011). 
 298 See, e.g., Memmott, supra, note 13 (discussing how the rape and murder of Jes-
sica Lunsford by a registered sex offender raised the issue that sex offender registra-
tion is insufficient to protect children, leading directly to the passing of sex-offender 
tracking statutes). 
 299 See Knights, 534 U.S. at 121. 
 300 But see discussion infra Part V.E (arguing that risk assessment is still necessary to 
ensure that the threat a sex offender poses actually justifies GPS tracking without vio-
lating his due process rights.). 
 301 PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF SEX 
OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 1 (2003), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf. 
 302 See, e.g., United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1215 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing the 
Langan report to justify overturning an unreasonably light sentence for a sex offend-
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The report divides “sex offenders” into the categories of “rapists” 
and “sexual assaulters,” but all 9,691 sex offenders included in the 
report were considered “violent sex offenders.”
303
  This group corre-
sponds to the offenders who would be liable under the GPS-tracking 
statutes of many states as posing the worst sex-offender threat.
304
  The 
chance that a sex-offender would be rearrested or reconvicted for any 
crime within three years of his release in 1994 was forty-three percent 
and twenty-four percent, respectively.
305
  These percentages may seem 
very high, but when compared to the non-sex offender control group, 
in which sixty-eight percent of the members were rearrested and for-
ty-eight percent were reconvicted, the recidivism threat for sex of-
fenders is much lower than the recidivism threat for non-sex offend-
ers.
306
 
According to the report, even though the re-arrest or reconvic-
tion rates for any crime may be less than rates for non-sex offenders, 
the threat that a sex offender will commit a sexual crime within three 
years of release is actually much higher than the threat of a non-sex 
offender committing such crimes.
307
  One thing to consider is that the 
study is limited to comparing sex offenders and non-sex offenders for 
a period of only three years after release, which may just indicate that 
sex offenders wait longer than three years after release to commit 
new sex offenses.  This hypothesis is supported by the fact that out of 
the sex-offender control group, prior to their incarceration, 28.5% 
had at least one arrest for a sex offense and 10.3% had at least one 
arrest for a sex offense committed against a child.
308
  This seems to 
justify the “government’s interest” that causes the authorities to focus 
on sex offenders as a specific threat that needs to be addressed in 
unique ways—namely, that they will commit new sex crimes long after 
they have served their time. 
The Supreme Court has yet to address a sex-offender case in 
which this specific report has been cited, but the Court has relied on 
similar data in the past.  When the Court granted certiorari to review 
sex-offender registration requirements in Smith, the Court based its 
 
er); United States v. Russell, 600 F.3d 631, 641–42 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing the 
Langan report to justify overturning a sex offender’s thirty-year ban from using a 
computer as too severe). 
 303 LANGAN ET AL., supra note 301, at 3. 
 304 See discussion supra Part II. 
 305 LANGAN ET AL., supra note 301, at 13 tbl.7. 
 306 Id. at 14. 
 307 See id. at 24 tbl.21 (showing that 5.3% of sex offenders were rearrested for a sex 
offense, in comparison to 1.3% of non-sex offenders). 
 308 Id. at 11 tbl.5. 
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ruling, at least in part, on a previous study by the Department of Jus-
tice, which stated that “[w]hen convicted sex offenders reenter socie-
ty, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be 
rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault.”
309
  The Court found that 
Alaska’s conclusion that “conviction for a sex offense provides evi-
dence of substantial risk of recidivism” was consistent with the “grave 
concerns over the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex of-
fenders and their dangerousness as a class.”
310
  Although not citing 
specific statistics, in 2003 the Supreme Court conclusively found that 
“[t]he risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is frightening and 
high.”
311
  Therefore, the Supreme Court may very well find that the 
reduction of this risk is a serious “government interest” that can 
counter the Fourth Amendment challenges presented against GPS-
tracking statutes, at least in part.
312
  
B. Reduced Rights Because Sex Offenders Are a “Danger to Society” 
If the Supreme Court was correct in 2003 and sex offenders pose 
a recidivism risk that makes them more dangerous than other crimi-
nals, then the general rights of sex offenders could be reduced for 
the greater good of society.  Although the Supreme Court has yet to 
review the constitutionality of GPS-tracking statutes, the Court has 
upheld the constitutionality of civil- and involuntary-commitment 
statutes that allow criminals or sex offenders who are still deemed to 
be a threat to society to be detained after completing their prison 
sentences.
313
  Thus, it is a strong argument that GPS-tracking statutes 
are less invasive than involuntary- and civil-commitment statutes that 
are already declared constitutional because the infringements dis-
cussed in Part III pale in comparison to restraining someone in a 
mental hospital or another government facility against his will.   
Civil and involuntary commitment represents the most invasive 
reduction of the rights of individuals who represent “dangers to soci-
 
 309 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33 
(2002))(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 310 Id.  
 311 Id. (quoting McKune, 536 U.S. at 34) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 312 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 313 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding the constitutionality 
of Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predator Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01–29a22 (2009), 
which is the strictest sex-offender civil-commitment statute in the country); 
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (upholding the constitutionality of in-
voluntary commitment of those individuals with mental illness who are shown to be a 
danger to themselves or others).  It is important to note that these statutes required 
an individualized risk assessment before they could be applied. 
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ety” because these proceedings literally take away an individual’s right 
to be free from custody even when his sentence has finished or when 
he has not committed a crime at all.  The Supreme Court has agreed 
with the common law at times that, where “one who takes charge of a 
third person is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control 
that person to prevent him from causing reasonably foreseeable bodi-
ly harm to others.”
314
  It is under this rationale—that the authorities 
should not release back into society anyone who is deemed a threat—
that civil and involuntary commitment were born.
315
 
Involuntary commitment and civil commitment are different 
types of restraints, and therefore they are address separately.  Invol-
untary commitment tends to refer to confinement in a mental hospi-
tal against one’s will.
316
  The Supreme Court set the national guide-
lines for involuntary commitment in O’Connor v. Donaldson where it 
held that a state may not confine someone against his will if he is not 
dangerous to himself or others.
317
  The flip side of this ruling is that a 
state has every right to hold someone against his will if he is found to 
be a danger to himself or others upon release.  Donaldson was com-
mitted for paranoid schizophrenia by his father against his will and 
spent fifteen years confined in an institution because the Florida laws 
at the time required involuntary commitment for anyone deemed 
“mentally incompetent.
318
  As soon as a jury determined that he could 
be released back into society without posing a danger to himself or 
others, his mental illness became irrelevant; the state could no longer 
hold him because its “government interest”
319
 in keeping the “harm-
less mentally ill” away from the public could no longer outweigh the 
rights of the individual.
320
 
Involuntary commitment is also allowed as an alternative to re-
leasing a prisoner at the end of his prison term if he is deemed to be 
a threat to society.
321
  Congress has passed legislation that protects the 
 
 314 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1961 (2010) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1963)). 
 315 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2011) (justifying civil commitment of “sexually 
violent predators” due to “the dangers they present.”).  
 316 See O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 564–65 (illustrating a challenge by a patient who was 
civilly confined in a mental hospital for fifteen years against his will). 
 317 Id. at 573–74 (specifying that mental illness alone is not enough for a state to 
involuntarily commit someone to a mental institution). 
 318 Id. at 566–67. 
 319 For a discussion of the balancing between “government interest” and Fourth 
Amendment rights, see discussion supra Part.IV.A.1 . 
 320 O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 574–75. 
 321 See 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2006).   
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public from a criminal who is due for release, but is “suffering from 
mental disease or defect.
322
  Even though the individual might have 
served his complete sentence, if courts believe “his release would cre-
ate a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious 
damage to property of another,”
323
 “the court shall commit the person 
to the custody of the Attorney General.”
324
  There is no more funda-
mental right than to be free from physical restraint.  But even this 
right is secondary to the interest of society if the person is shown to 
be a threat to others. 
Civil commitment is a more recent concept that applies specifi-
cally to sex offenders who are held beyond their initial sentence be-
cause of their individual risk of recidivism.
325
  For example, the Kansas 
legislature found that “existing civil commitment procedures . . . are 
inadequate to address the special needs of sexually violent predators 
and the risks they present to society” and enacted a separate statutory 
process to keep sex offenders behind bars for as long as they posed a 
threat due to a showing of “mental abnormality or personality disor-
der.”
326
  The first sex offender who was committed under the act, 
Leroy Hendricks, was originally convicted for “taking indecent liber-
ties with two 13-year-old boys.”
327
  After nearly ten years of his sen-
tence had passed, the state filed a petition to keep Hendricks under 
civil commitment right before his scheduled release because he was a 
habitual child molester and posed a high threat of recidivism.
328
  
Hendricks challenged his commitment and the Kansas Sexually Vio-
lent Predator Act ultimately receiving a grant of certiorari by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
329
 
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas statute on 
various grounds, clarifying that even though freedom of bodily re-
straint from arbitrary government action is at the core of due process, 
 
 322 Id. 
 323 § 4246(a) (emphasis added). 
 324 § 4246(d). 
 325 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350–51 (1997). 
 326 § 59-29a01.  “Mental abnormality” is defined as “a congenital or acquired con-
dition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to 
commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to 
the health and safety of others.  Id. § 59-29a02.  Thus, if an individualized risk as-
sessment finds that a sex offender has a high risk of reoffending, that would likely 
qualify as a “mental abnormality” under the Kansas Act. 
 327 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 353 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 328 Id. at 354–55. 
 329 Id. at 350, 354; Kansas v. Hendricks, 116 S.Ct. 2522, 2522 (1996) (granting cer-
tiorari). 
DANTE_ FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  10:51 AM 
1216 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1169 
it is not an absolute right.
330
  The Court found that the right to be free 
from bodily restraint is subject to “manifold restraints to which every 
person is necessarily subject for the common good” and “[o]n any 
other basis organized society could not exist with safety to its mem-
bers.”
331
  The Court rejected the argument that “mental illness,” as 
opposed to “mental abnormality” prerequisite that Kansas statute in-
corporated, should be a prerequisite for any involuntary commitment 
and that the Kansas statute’s focus on the dangerousness of the indi-
vidual satisfied due process.
332
 
The right to be free from restraint is one of the most cherished 
liberties that the Constitution bestows upon American citizens, but 
this right comes secondary to the safety of society when the individual 
is deemed to be dangerous in a way that cannot be controlled outside 
of custody.  Although the GPS-tracking statutes are extremely invasive 
on the sex offender’s rights to move freely, control his own body, or 
be free from unreasonable searches,
333
 it is very likely that the Su-
preme Court, which has upheld the constitutionality of civil commit-
ment,
334
 would also find constitutional the curtailment of other con-
stitutional rights based on an individualized assessment that the 
person in question poses a continued danger to society. 
C. Diminished Rights of Parolees or Probationers 
An additional argument supporting the constitutionality of sex-
offender tracking is that most of the sex-offender-tracking statutes on-
ly apply to offenders while they are on parole,
335
 probation,
336
 or un-
der community supervision,
337
 where the rights of the released of-
fenders are not at their full pre-conviction level.  It is important to 
note that probation, which typically refers to an alternative sentence 
 
 330 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356. 
 331 Id. at 356–57 (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 
(1905))(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 332 Id. at 360. 
 333 See discussion supra Parts III.B–D. 
 334 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350–51. 
 335 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004 (West 2007) (requiring electronic monitoring 
for sex offenders who are “released on parole” (emphasis added)).  
 336 See, e.g., MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 265, § 47 (2006) (establishing electronic monitor-
ing “as a requirement of any term of probation” (emphasis added)). 
 337 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.30(3) (West 2010) (requiring electronic monitor-
ing for certain sex offenders who are “placed on probation or community control” 
(emphasis added)). 
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that does not involve any prison time,
338
 can have a very different 
meaning in the context of to sex offenders, who may be placed on 
probation for extended periods of time even after serving jail time.  
For example, the Florida law states that periods of probation shall not 
exceed two years generally,
339
 but periods of probation for sex offend-
ers can continue for decades after incarceration.
340
  As more states 
enact harsh mandatory prison sentences for sex offenders,
341
 the 
terms of probation, parole, and community supervision tend to mean 
the same thing: if a sex offender ever gets out of prison, the state will 
watch him for decades or for life. 
With regard to parolees generally, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that “the Fourth Amendment does not render the 
States powerless to address . . . concerns [of recidivism] effectively.”
342
  
Because probationers, and implicitly parolees, pose a higher risk of 
recidivism, a state can “justifiably focus on probationers in a way that 
it does not on the ordinary citizen.”
343
  Thus, even though a police of-
ficer would not be able to walk up to a citizen and search him for 
contraband or search his apartment for evidence of illegal activity, 
the Supreme Court authorized such searches of parolees in Samson v. 
California and of probationers in Knights, respectively. 
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Samson, “a State has an 
overwhelming interest in supervising parolees because parolees . . . 
are more likely to commit future criminal offenses.”
344
 Because most 
sex-offender tracking statutes either have limited scope to the term of 
probation, parole, or community supervision, or mandate lifetime 
probation for certain crimes, sex offenders’ rights are not at their full 
 
 338 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1240 (8th ed. 2004) (defining probation as “[a] 
court-imposed criminal sentence that, subject to stated conditions, releases a con-
victed person into the community instead of sending the criminal to jail or prison”). 
 339 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.04 (West 2011). 
 340 See, e.g., Honrine v. McNeil, No. 5:07cv227/MCR/EMT, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
128271, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2009) (discussing a plea agreement for sexual bat-
tery on a child that consisted of two years community supervision and twenty years of 
probation); Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 805 (Fla. 2008) (discussing a plea 
agreement for three counts of lewd or lascivious battery and exhibition on a child 
under the age of sixteen that included 364 days of prison time, two years of commu-
nity supervision, and eight years on probation). 
 341 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520b(2) (LexisNexis 2011) (setting the 
mandatory prison term for “criminal sexual conduct in the first degree” between 
twenty-five years and lifetime without parole). 
 342 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 854 (2006). 
 343 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001).   
 344 Samson, 547 U.S. at 853 (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 
357, 365 (1998)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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pre-conviction level.  It is likely that the Supreme Court will approve 
some type of diminished constitutional protections for sex offenders 
because of their previous crimes, provided that the laws that curtail 
those protections were in place before the crime was committed to 
give constructive notice to an offender about the possible conse-
quences of his actions.
345
 
V. FINDING THE PROPER BALANCE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL STATE AND 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
The proper balance between the rights of a sex offender who 
has served his sentence and the right of the government to protect 
the public from the risk of recidivism has not yet been decided, but at 
some point the Supreme Court will be asked to review the various ar-
guments on both sides.  Nothing is certain, but Supreme Court prec-
edent on issues at least comparable to the long-term or lifetime GPS 
tracking of sex offenders provides insight into the Court’s likely de-
termination.
346
  This Part will list the various conclusions that can be 
drawn from Court precedent with regard to statutes currently in 
force, and how they should be amended based on constitutional 
principles. 
A. Limited GPS-Tracking of Sex Offenders is Likely Constitutional 
First and foremost, this Comment concludes that GPS-tracking 
of sex offenders can be brought within the bounds of the Constitu-
tion.  The recidivism threat that sex offenders pose is real,
347
 and GPS-
tracking statutes are less restrictive than other statutes that have al-
ready been upheld.  The Supreme Court has already held in Hen-
dricks that a state may implement a statute that subjects a post-
incarceration sex offender to civil commitment if he is deemed to be 
a threat to himself due to a mental abnormality.
348
  Any sex offender 
who shows a predisposition to committing such crimes would be con-
sidered “mentally abnormal” under the Kansas Act and would be eli-
gible for civil commitment.
349
  Taking away a person’s freedom is the 
most invasive infringement of constitutional rights that a government 
can impose on an individual, but such actions have already been held 
 
 345 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 346 See discussion supra Parts III–IV. 
 347 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 348 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 349 See supra text accompanying note 328. 
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constitutional when a person is a “danger to society.” 
350
  GPS-tracking 
statutes undeniably infringe on offender’s’ rights, but these in-
fringements are still less severe than civil commitment, which has al-
ready been held constitutional.
351
  Thus, the limited GPS-tracking of 
sex offenders can also be constitutional with a showing that these in-
dividuals have a predisposition for committing such crimes.  Fur-
thermore, the Court in Hendricks held that safeguards, such as the 
ones in the Kansas civil-commitment statute, and determination 
based on narrow individual circumstances were within the Court’s 
“understanding of ordered liberty.”
352
   Therefore, if GPS-tracking 
statutes are written and applied in way that would fit within the 
Court’s “understanding of ordered liberty,” such government action 
would likely be held constitutional.  As the statutes stand right now, 
some changes are necessary to reach that point. 
B. Retroactive Application Violates the Ex Post Facto Clause 
In order for sex-offender GPS tracking statutes to be held consti-
tutional, they should not be applied to crimes that were committed 
before the statutes’ effective dates.
353
  In Smith, the Supreme Court 
held that registration requirements, and the dissemination of sex-
offender information to the public, constituted a civil regulatory 
scheme and were not punitive in nature, which would have made the 
Ex Post Facto Clause applicable.
354
  With GPS-tracking of sex offend-
ers, however, the states are imposing requirements on sex offenders 
that go far beyond the mere dissemination of information to the 
community.
355
  Although registration may make offenders’ lives more 
difficult, GPS-tracking is a constant infringement on the offenders’ 
freedom of movement,
356
 bodily integrity from unreasonable govern-
 
 350 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 351 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 352 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997).  The Court reached this conclu-
sion, in part, because Kansas’s civil-commitment statute was based on three different 
individualized risk assessments conducted prior to commitment, which also had 
three different avenues for review: (1) an annual review of the detention by the 
court, (2) ability by the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services to end the 
commitment at any time if the offender’s dangerousness has changed, and (3) the 
availability of a release petition, which the committed offender could file a at any 
time.  Id. at 353.   
 353 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 354 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003). 
 355 See Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 196–97 (Mass. 2009) (explaining 
that a lifetime GPS-tracking requirement is “dramatically more intrusive and burden-
some” than registration only). 
 356 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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ment intrusion,
357
 and freedom from unreasonable searches.
358
  The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly used the Mendoza-Martinez factors to 
decide whether a statute is punitive, in which case the Ex Post Facto 
Clause would forbid retroactive application, or a civil-regulatory 
scheme, in which case retroactive application is allowed.
359
  When re-
viewing the effect of GPS-tracking statutes under the Mendoza-Martinez 
test, the GPS-tracking statutes fall much more on the punitive side of 
the equation than registration laws do.
360
    Therefore, this Comment 
finds that any retroactive application of sex-offender GPS-tracking 
laws is unconstitutional. 
C. Technology Utilized Should Be as Minimally Invasive as Possible 
Any technology that the states use to track the location and 
movement of sex offenders should infringe as little as possible on the 
individual’s bodily integrity.
361
  When reviewing limitations on a per-
son’s bodily integrity, the Court has already stated that it will take into 
account whether the limitations are justified in the circumstances or 
whether they are made in an improper manner.
362
  Even though the 
Supreme Court may find that the limited GPS-tracking of sex offend-
ers is justified after balancing the offender’s individual rights against 
the government’s interest in protecting society against sex-offender 
recidivism,
363
 there still need to be safeguards in place to ensure that 
the offender’s rights are not infringed more than is absolutely neces-
sary.  In order to protect those rights, the states should use the small-
est, least visible tracking devices that are practical to obtain necessary 
information under the statutes.
364
  Technology is improving, and as 
the technology becomes more reliable and less noticeable, the state 
should safeguard an offender’s mobility by ensuring that the GPS 
tracking device will not evolve into a “modern-day scarlet letter,” ex-
posing the offender to public ridicule, fear, or hostility any time he 
leaves his home. 
If the technology that a state uses malfunctions frequently, re-
sulting in incessant threats of an arrest to an offender who has done 
nothing wrong, then the state should consider using more reliable 
 
 357 See discussion supra Part III.C. 
 358 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 359 See supra notes 183–87 and accompanying text. 
 360 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 361 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 362 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966). 
 363 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
 364 See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
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tracking devices.
365
  If, as public awareness of such tracking statutes 
increases, the state determines that the utilized device is too visible 
and instantly exposes the wearer to public condemnation, then the 
state should examine whether or not a smaller device, or perhaps one 
that can be worn underneath clothing and still transmit required lo-
cation data, should be adopted.
366
  In addition, if a state requires noti-
fication and approval before a sex offender leave the state, the state 
needs to establish an efficient procedure to ensure that the wait for 
such approval is not unreasonably long as to make interstate travel 
that complies within the law impractical.
367
 
Finally, even if technology evolves to the point where implanta-
ble sub-dermal devices become viable, states should never use them 
for the tracking of sex offenders, and state statutes should specifically 
authorize only the use of external devices.
368
  Using sub-dermal im-
plants to track sex offenders is much more intrusive and should not 
be used when less-invasive means are available to achieve the same 
end.
369
  Since the ultimate decision on this issue will come down to a 
balancing the infringement of the individual’s rights against the 
needs of the state to address with sex-offender recidivism, each state 
should use the least visible and stigmatizing external devices available 
to reduce public condemnation and limit the intrusiveness of the 
GPS device as much as possible.
370
 
D. Tracking in Protected Areas Violates the Fourth Amendment 
Any evidence obtained from a GPS tracking device while the of-
fender is in a protected area where there is a legitimate expectation 
of privacy should explicitly be inadmissible against the offender.
371
  
The tracking devices that sex offenders continuously wear provide 
the police with information about their location that can ultimately 
be used as evidence.
372
  When a sex offender is in the public view, 
such location information is not protected by the Fourth Amendment 
under the Supreme Court’s holding in Katz.
373
  Anyone can see the 
offender’s location when he is at the store, sitting in a baseball stadi-
 
 365 See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 366 See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 367 See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
 368 See discussion supra Part III.C.2. 
 369 See discussion supra Part III.C.2. 
 370 See discussion supra Part III.C. 
 371 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 372 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 373 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
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um, or driving on a highway, so the offender does not have a reason-
able expectation of privacy in these areas.
374
  Likewise, the Fourth 
Amendment protections do not apply in areas in which, by court or-
der or statute, the offender has been forbidden to go, such as near 
the victim’s residence or near a grade school.
375
  When the GPS track-
ing device is transmitting from areas where even a sex offender has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, however, such as his home or an-
other private property, the state should not obtain location-based ev-
idence that it would not otherwise be able to obtain legally.
376
 
In sum, in order to comply with the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Karo, statutes should specifically limit the use of evidence from GPS 
trackers to evidence obtained in public areas or excluded zones 
where the sex offender does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.
377
  Ideally, tracking devices would not provide any location 
data while the offender is within a protected area, but programming 
a device to recognize the difference between a public area and a pro-
tected area for each individual offender is not an efficient use of state 
resources.  Instead, the recommended option is for the state to ex-
plicitly assert in the statute that any location data will not be utilized if 
the police would not have been constitutionally permitted to obtain 
such information without the tracker.
378
  For example, while an active 
tracking device will continue to transmit the offender’s location even 
when he is home, protected under the Fourth Amendment, the main 
threat to the individual is that such data will be used against him in a 
court of law.
379
  If a state establishes that such evidence from private 
areas will be excluded per se under the state’s tracking statute, the in-
fringement of the individual’s Fourth Amendment protections will be 
reduced.
380
 
E. GPS Tracking Without Individualized Risk Assessment is 
Unconstitutional 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, any decision to impose 
GPS-tracking on a sex offender needs to be based on an individual-
ized risk assessment and not, as most statutes are currently written, 
 
 374 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 375 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 376 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 377 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 378 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 379 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 380 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
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based on the crime committed.
381
  One of the main reasons that the 
Court upheld Kansas’s civil-commitment statute in Hendricks was that 
the statute ensured that every civilly committed individual was actual-
ly a danger to society due to a mental abnormality and that this issue 
could not be resolved otherwise.
382
  The current majority of statutes, 
including the Florida, California, and Massachusetts Models, impose 
GPS-tracking requirements on entire classes of sex offenders based 
on the crime committed.
383
  Without safeguards in place to ensure 
that a particular individual actually does pose enough of a danger to 
society to justify tracking his location and movement, a statutory 
scheme does not fall under the Court’s “understanding of ordered 
liberty” and will not be granted the same constitutional leeway that 
the Kansas civil-commitment statute received.
384
 
VI. A PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL TRACKING OF 
SEX OFFENDERS 
Though the current statutory models for the GPS-tracking of sex 
offenders do not properly balance the rights of post-incarceration sex 
offenders with the government’s interest in protecting the public 
from sex-offender recidivism, there are ways to bring the two oppos-
ing interests into balance.
385
  Below, this Comment provides the text 
of a model statute that illustrates how legislators can draft GPS-
tracking legislation to survive constitutional review.  This model stat-
ute is a combination of provisions of various GPS-tracking statutes 
that are already in effect.  Any state can tailor this Model Statute to 
address the crimes that the state would like to cover, the expense it 
wishes to bare in such a tracking program, and the GPS tracking de-
vices it wishes to use. 
Model Sex-Offender Tracking Statute 
 Purpose 
The purpose of this Act is to protect the public generally, and children 
specifically, from the threat of recidivism that Sexually Violent Predators and 
Child Sexual Predators can pose when released from incarceration.  In addi-
tion to registration requirements and other restrictions that are applicable to 
sex offenders in this jurisdiction, this Act allows for the GPS tracking of those 
 
 381 See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
 382 See Kan. v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 352–53 (1997). 
 383 See discussion supra Parts II.A–C. 
 384 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 385 See discussion supra Part V.A–E. 
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Violent Sex Offenders who pose the highest risk of recidivism and are the great-
est dangers to society.  The purpose of such tracking is both to serve as a deter-
rent for future crimes effectively and to ensure that Violent Sex Offenders do 
not enter prohibited Exclusion Zones, where the risk of re-offense is heightener. 
 Definitions: As Used in This Act: 
1.  “Child Sexual Predator” is a person who was previously convicted of 
a violent sex crime and is predisposed to commit such sex crimes against chil-
dren in the future because he or she has a mental disorder or abnormality that 
has been verified by a licensed doctor or psychologist or because he or she has a 
history of committing crimes that indicate an ongoing lustful predisposition 
toward children, as determined by a Court upon review of evidence from what-
ever source is deemed relevant.
386
 
2.  “Conviction” means that there was either (a) a judgment or determi-
nation of guilt at trial, or (b) a guilty or nolo contendere plea.
387
 
3.  “Court” means a judicial district court of this jurisdiction.
388
  
4.  “Exclusion Zone” is any zone in which a person wearing a GPS 
tracking device is prohibited from going, unless the person is merely travelling 
through the zone in order to reach another location.
389
 
5.  “GPS Tracking” means the tracking through the use of any GPS 
Tracking Device that identifies a person’s location and actively reports or rec-
ords such information.
390
   
6. “GPS Tracking Device” is any device that identifies a person’s loca-
tion and actively reports or records such information.  It includes any compa-
rable technology that is worn externally on the offender’s person.
391
 
7.  “Judicial Determination” is a decision by the Court that a person is or 
continues to be a Child Sexual Criminal or a Violent Sex Criminal as defined 
by this Act.
392
 
8.  “Mental Abnormality” is an acquired or congenital condition that af-
fects the volitional or emotional of a person in any way that predisposes the 
person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a way that makes the per-
son a danger to the safety or health of other people.
 393
 
 
 386 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.1(1) (2011). 
 387 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-23(a) (West 2011). 
 388 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.1(2) (2011). 
 389 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.48(1)(a) (West 2011). 
 390 See id. § 301.48(1)(b). 
 391 See id. § 301.48(1)(b). 
 392 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.1(3) (2011). 
 393 See id. § 15:560.1(4). 
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9.  “Sexually Violent Criminal” means an offender who has been convict-
ed of a Violent Sex Offense and who has a Mental Abnormality or antisocial 
personality disorder that makes the offender likely to engage in predatory sex-
ually violent offenses as determined by the Court upon receipt and review of 
information from whatever source the Court deems relevant.
394
 
10.  “Violent Sex Crime” is: 
a. A Conviction for any of the following crimes: 
(i) Rape; 
(ii) Aggravated Rape; 
(iii) Sexual battery; 
(iv) Battery; 
(v) Sexual exploitation of a child; 
(vi) Aggravated sexual exploitation of a child; 
(vii) Statutory rape; 
(ix) Especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a child; 
(x) Rape of a child; 
(xi) Incest; 
(xii) Solicitation of a child; 
(xi) Sexual battery by an authority figure. 
b.  A Conviction for attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of-
fense listed in subdivision (a) of this section. 
c.  A Conviction for being an accessory after the fact, or criminal respon-
sibility for facilitating the commission of any offense listed in subdivision (a) 
of this section.395 
Applicability of the Act. 
1.  When a Court is initially sentencing a person convicted of any Vio-
lent Sex Crime, the Court may impose GPS-tracking as a condition of release 
following any period of incarceration if there is a Judicial Determination that 
the person being sentenced is either a Sexually Violent Criminal or a Child 
Sexual Criminal under this Act, and thus a danger to society.  The Court may 
establish the length of such tracking based on the individual risk assessment of 
the person, the length of probation, parole, or community supervision as re-
quired by law, or, if the law is silent, whatever length of supervision that the 
Court deems just and proper based on the individual circumstances of the per-
son being sentenced. 
2.  When a person who has been Convicted of any Violent Sex Crime is to 
be released back into society on probation, parole, or community supervision, 
 
 394 See id. § 15:560.1(5). 
 395 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-301(2) (West 2011). 
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the supervising authorities may make a motion to the Court to impose GPS-
tracking on that person as a condition of release.  The Court may impose such 
monitoring conditions if it has been shown that the person is either a Sexually 
Violent Criminal or a Child Sexual Criminal under this Act, and thus a dan-
ger to society.  The Court may establish the length of such tracking based upon 
the individual risk assessment of the person, the length of probation, parole, or 
community supervision as required by law, or, if the law is silent, whatever 
length of supervision that the Court deems just and proper based upon the in-
dividual circumstances of the person being released. 
3.  When the Court is sentencing a person convicted of any Violent Sex 
Crime for a violation of his or her probation, parole, or community supervi-
sion, the Court may impose GPS-tracking as a condition of release following 
any period of incarceration if it has been shown that the person sentenced is 
either a Sexually Violent Criminal or a Child Sexual Criminal under this Act, 
and thus a danger to society.  The Court may establish the length of such 
tracking based on the individual risk assessment of the person and his or her 
history of violating previous conditions of release.  Such a period of GPS-
tracking may be imposed for any period up to, and including, the person’s 
natural life in response to a violation of probation, parole, or conditional re-
lease. 
Limitations of the Act 
1.  The location data gathered from a GPS tracking device is only admis-
sible against the offender in a court of law if the data was not taken while the 
person was in a place or area where he or she has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, such as within his or her home or curtilage.  Location data is admis-
sible against the offender if the data was taken while the offender was in a 
public place, Exclusion Zone, or other area where the offender does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
2.  This Act may only be applied based on an individualized risk assess-
ment, and not solely on the crime committed or any other generalized risk as-
sessment that looks beyond the individual in question. 
3.  This Act may only be applied on those offenders who have committed 
their offense or violation of probation, parole, or community supervision on or 
after the effective date.  Any retroactive application is prohibited. 
VII.     CONCLUSION 
Not all sex-offender statutes are unconstitutional, but the majori-
ty of statutes currently in force require adjustments.  Unlike registra-
tion requirements, which merely notify members of the public of a 
possible threat in their neighborhoods, the primary result of sex-
offender tracking statutes is to perpetually gather evidence against a 
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sex offender for crimes that may happen.  The punitive nature of life-
time electronic monitoring, while possibly serving the public interest, 
is a serious infringement on an individual’s freedoms in a variety of 
ways, and legislators should take measures to better balance an indi-
vidual offender’s rights with the interests of the public.  This Com-
ment has offered one possibility for restoring the balance between 
the rights of the offender and the security interest of society, but this 
is not the only to reach such a balance.  In the end, it is for the Su-
preme Court to determine the correct balance, but resolving this is-
sue may take years or even decades.  In the mean time, states should 
use the ideas developed this Comment to bring current GPS-tracking 
statutes more in line with Supreme Court precedent. 
